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File: aabmf_27.txt(3) Leadership and Military Discipline. Observation. There were sufficient instances of administrative/disciplinary problems to warrant concern regarding adequate leadership training for AE element OICs and NCOICs.- Discussion. Although not excessive for an AE operation of this magnitude, there were enough administrative and/or disciplinary problems among the personnel to raise concerns about the adequacy of leadership training and experience of OICs and NCOICs. It is significant to note that most of the problems or infractions were relatively minor; only three Articles 15 were given to AE personnel in the AOR during the entire Operation. Five officers were removed from OIC positions for cause; four of them were field grade. Several NCOICs were removed from their positions for cause. Most of the removals were a result of poor or inconsistent leadership. Recommendation. Effective leadership is extremely important in an combat environment. This is true not only for the active duty force, but for the ARC personnel who wear the uniform less frequently. Leadership and management training should be provided to all officers and NCOs on a recurring basis, either by formal means or through correspondence courses. In addition, periodic training in military standards of conduct and the Uniform Code of Military Justice would benefit all personnel. b. AE Operations. (l) Peacetime Versus Contingency AE Operations. Observation. The TAES was deployed in August with the mission to support contingency A~ operations. However, the delay in hostilities and the ensuing five-month build up of US forces, created the need for an interim pre-hostilities AE system. That caused a blurring in the distinction between peacetime and contingency AE operations. Discussion. When war didn't break out right away and US troop strength continued to grow, the AECC developed a prehostilities AE system. This issue was complicated because the AECC was tactically oriented, both operationally and with respect to equipment and training. More importantly, they were forced to operate the prehostilities system, with its voluminous patient reporting and tracking requirements, while planning and posturing for a contingency operation. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, the AECC was consistently asked to provide more patient information than is required for contingency operations. - Recommendation. We must recognize that in prolonged operations such as DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the AECC may be required to operate in both contingency and peacetime modes, either sequentially or simultaneously. They should be properly staffed, 27
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