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File: aabmf_27.txt
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(3) Leadership and Military Discipline. 
 
Observation. There were sufficient instances of 
administrative/disciplinary problems to warrant concern regarding 
adequate leadership training for AE element OICs and NCOICs.- 
 
Discussion. Although not excessive for an AE operation of this 
magnitude, there were enough administrative and/or disciplinary 
problems among the personnel to raise concerns about the adequacy of 
leadership training and experience of OICs and NCOICs. It is 
significant to note that most of the problems or infractions were 
relatively minor; only three Articles 15 were given to AE personnel 
in the AOR during the entire Operation. Five officers were removed 
from OIC positions for cause; four of them were field grade. Several 
NCOICs were removed from their positions for cause. Most of the 
removals were a result of poor or inconsistent leadership. 
 
Recommendation. Effective leadership is extremely important in an 
combat environment. This is true not only for the active duty force, 
but for the ARC personnel who wear the uniform less frequently. 
Leadership and management training should be provided to all officers 
and NCOs on a recurring basis, either by formal means or through 
correspondence courses. In addition, periodic training in military 
standards of conduct and the Uniform Code of Military Justice would 
benefit all personnel. 
 
b. AE Operations. 
 
(l) Peacetime Versus Contingency AE Operations. 
 
Observation. The TAES was deployed in August with the mission to 
support contingency A~ operations. However, the delay in hostilities 
and the ensuing five-month build up of US forces, created the need 
for an interim pre-hostilities AE system. That caused a blurring in 
the distinction between peacetime and contingency AE operations. 
 
Discussion. When war didn't break out right away and US troop 
strength continued to grow, the AECC developed a prehostilities AE 
system. This issue was complicated because the AECC was tactically 
oriented, both operationally and with respect to equipment and 
training. More importantly, they were forced to operate the 
prehostilities system, with its voluminous patient reporting and 
tracking requirements, while planning and posturing for a contingency 
operation. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, the AECC was 
consistently asked to provide more patient information than is 
required for contingency operations. 
 
- Recommendation. We must recognize that in prolonged operations such 
as DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the AECC may be required to operate in both 
contingency and peacetime modes, either sequentially or 
simultaneously. They should be properly staffed, 
 
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