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toward the importance of COMSEC accountability and timely 
destruction. Although the TAES had sufficient COMSEC expertise 
scattered among the deployed elements to provide essential controls, 
the potential for a serious breach in security was very real, and 
such a compromise would have been disastrous to communications in 
support of AE operations.

Recommendation. An increased commitment to COMSEC training, 
regardless of rank or position, must be initiated by all active and 
ARC AE units. Training and frequent recertification must be 
accomplished and documented for all communications personnel, as well 
as any officers and NCOs that may hold positions where COMSEC 
responsibility might be applicable.

Observation. Serious difficulty was experienced regarding the 
resupply of COMSEC materials needed by deployed AE elements.

Discussion. As the number of AE stations grew and repositioning 
became more frequent, so did the difficulty in supplying them with 
current COMSEC materials. Most units sent elements with a three-month 
supply, while some deploying elements arrived without any COMSEC 
materials at all, compounding the distribution problem from the 
start. Guidance provided by originating base COMSEC managers was 
varied. Issue and resupply was either to be coordinated through home 
station account managers for the duration of the deployment or 
through access to theater account managers once deployed. In cases 
where individual elements had expired COMSEC, or none at all, it was 
provided by another station on a nightly basis via KL-43 until 
current COMSEC materials arrived. This "Band-Aid" approach to 
essential communications support should have been the rare exception 
rather than the familiar practice it became.

Recommendation. Coordinate and develop theaterbased COMSEC accounts 
for any deployments that might exceed three months to ensure timely 
and consistent distribution of COMSEC resupply materials to field 
elements.

g. Transportation.

(1) General.

Observation. Vehicles authorized/assigned to AE UTCs could not 
adequately support the number of personnel, amount of equipment, or 
environments encountered by AE elements deployed throughout the 
theater.

Discussion. The need for versatility in vehicle
quantity and capability to suit requirements ranging from flightline 
operations to harsh, off-road terrain travel became clear during 
DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Existing authorizations found in TA-012 for 
AECCs, AELTs and MASFs provide minimally sufficient vehicles to 
support equipment/supply loadout without consideration

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