AF RESERVE MONOGRAPH OPERATION DESERT SHIELD RESERVISTS AT SHARJAH:

File: aabqn_16.txt
Page: 16
Total Pages: 25
            

            Communication through a Mobile Air Readiness Center (MARC). Only one
            channel was dedicated to airlift resulting in long delays in passing and
            receiving information.36
            
            		Another problem occurred when the unit experienced difficulty
            with the Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) from the ALCC because they did not
            arrive in the Air Operations Center (AOC) in a timely manner. On several
            occasions the ATO was not completely finalized until midnight local time,
            even though it might task missions departing as early as 0500 the following
            morning. This meant additional crews had to be kept in crew rest based
            solely on anticipated tasking.37
            
            		En route coordination was also difficult to accomplish because
            not 11 transit locations received copies of the ATO and, therefore, did not
            have credible station workload information. In addition, en route
            communications were not effective because of poor High Frequency (HF)
            communications with the Airlift Operations Center (ALOC). 38
            
            Deployment Concerns
            
                    Volunteerism/Mobilization
            
            		A number of concerns surfaced almost immediately following
            initial notification of possible deployment. One of the most significant was
            that Reserve tactical airlift wings had eight C-130 primary assigned aircraft
            (PAA). Unit personnel had trained to go to war using the preplanned C-130
            aviation package upon mobilization. If the President had mobilized the
            Reserve, two units could have supplied all of their assets and satisfied the
            tasking. Since the Reserves had not been mobilized, and the tasking called
            for building a 16-aircraft provisional unit and for the necessary crews and
            other support personnel, it was necessary to involve five different C-130
            units to secure enough volunteers and aircraft.39
            
            
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            36 Intvw, P.R. Stone and D.G. Lanfear with SMSgt Mike Hood, 94
          TAW/CP Supv, 15 Jan 91 (hereafter cited as Hood Iritvw).
            
            37 Willis Intvw.
             
            38  lbid.
            
            39 Desert Shield Lessons Learned Worksheet, 908 TAG/CC; JULLS Long
            Report, 94 TAW/RM, 24 Apr 91.
            
                 

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