AF RESERVE MONOGRAPH OPERATION DESERT SHIELD RESERVISTS AT SHARJAH:

File: aabqn_17.txt
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             		The question of mobilizing the Reserve was, of course, the
             prerogative of the President and it was not until 22 August that he chose to
             exercise that option. Even then, however, the Major Commands
             (MAJCOMs) opted to mobilize selected unit type codes (UTCs) in place of
             mobilizing entire units.40
            
            		For reservists, whether they served on volunteer status or active-
            duty status was an extremely important issue. Different financial, medical,
            commissary, exchange, and insurance entitlements were only parts of their
            concern. Some members found their employers to be very sympathetic
            and supportive of their obligations to the Reserve if their units were
            mobilized, but they made it clear that if members were not mobilized but
            volunteered instead, their jobs might not be available when they
            returned.
            
            		Other difficulties occurred in certain sections of the units when
            some people immediately agreed to deploy and expected everyone else to 
            do the same. Those who felt their civilian jobs might be in jeopardy if they
            volunteered underwent tremendous pressure to nonetheless "volunteer."
            There were also those with personal obligations such as young children,
            pregnant wife, financial difficulties, etc., who thought their spouses would
            understand if they had to deploy because of mobilization, but would not
            understand if they volunteered. Some members even allowed their families
            and employers to think they had not volunteered but had been mobilized,
            only to have them learn the truth when CNN Television newscasters
            informed the world of their real status.42
            
            		Confusion also existed in the units because this type of operation
            had not occurred before and there was either no direction or conflicting
            direction from HQ AFRES and MAC, the gaining MAJCOM, concerning a
            number of important issues: should the units issue green identification
            cards indicating active duty personnel, or red identification cards indicating
            Reserve personnel? What medical and financial benefits would ensue?
            How about life insurance? Would the Veterans Reemployment Act apply
            so those who volunteered could indeed get their jobs back? Would the
            Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act apply so they would not lose their
            homes if they missed some mortgage payments? All of these questions
            
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               40  Blair Intvw.
            
               41 Ltr, 94 TAW/DO to 94 TAW/CC, "After Action Report, Desert Shield,"
            11 Jan 91.
            
               42 Willis Intvw.
            
                    

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