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File: aabqn_21.txt
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            items were deployed. It was also essential to review the supply channel
            and the parts ordering procedures prior to departure.51
       
            		It was also difficult to replace medical equipment and medications using
            the military re-supply system. Most had to be obtained by purchasing them
            on the local economy.52
       
	Equipment/Supplies
       
            		Planning for the deployment of essential equipment and supplies
            was extremely difficult because of the uncertain destination. Information
            contained in the site survey on Sharjah were considered suspect with
            regard to aircraft parking, facilities, security, health care, etc.
            Consequently, aircraft departed their home stations loaded to gross weights
            exceeding normal operating limits, and carrying people and equipment that
            were not needed and leaving people and equipment that were needed.
            Some people were required to deploy with as many as six bags: Type A-
            mobility bags, operations ensemble bags, C-bags, two personal bags,
            handcarry bags, plus aircrew members carried helmet bags and D-bags.53
       
            		Having to deploy aircraft from the five locations also added to the
            difficulties. No one could be sure of what each unit would take. Since
            there was no standard for the War Readiness Spares Kits for the C-1 30H,
            what was to be taken was left to the individual units to determine. This
            resulted in duplication of some parts and the nonexistence of other parts.
            In addition, the units did not have adequate bench stock and there was not
            enough assets to service home station aircraft and deployed aircraft at the
            three different sites. Forced to requisition parts through normal MAC
            channels while deployed, timely arrival of spare parts was not possible. The
            first spare part to the deployed location arrived the day the 94th departed
            the area of responsibility (AOR). Fortunately, the C-130Hs proved to be
            extremely reliable and no aircraft had to be grounded due to lack of spare
            parts. Amazingly, all missions were flown with a 100 percent reliability rate.
            No sorties were lost.54
       
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               51 Desert Shield After Action Rpt, 94 TAW/MA to 94 TAW/CC, Undated.
       
               52 JULLS Long Rpt, 700 TAS/DO, 24 Apr 91.
       
              53 JULLS Long Rpt, 908 TAG/RMX, 24 Apr 91.
       
              54 Cameron Intvw; Rpt, JULLS, 908 TAG/CC.
       
                   
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