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File: aabqn_21.txt
items were deployed. It was also essential to review the supply channel
and the parts ordering procedures prior to departure.51
It was also difficult to replace medical equipment and medications using
the military re-supply system. Most had to be obtained by purchasing them
on the local economy.52
Equipment/Supplies
Planning for the deployment of essential equipment and supplies
was extremely difficult because of the uncertain destination. Information
contained in the site survey on Sharjah were considered suspect with
regard to aircraft parking, facilities, security, health care, etc.
Consequently, aircraft departed their home stations loaded to gross weights
exceeding normal operating limits, and carrying people and equipment that
were not needed and leaving people and equipment that were needed.
Some people were required to deploy with as many as six bags: Type A-
mobility bags, operations ensemble bags, C-bags, two personal bags,
handcarry bags, plus aircrew members carried helmet bags and D-bags.53
Having to deploy aircraft from the five locations also added to the
difficulties. No one could be sure of what each unit would take. Since
there was no standard for the War Readiness Spares Kits for the C-1 30H,
what was to be taken was left to the individual units to determine. This
resulted in duplication of some parts and the nonexistence of other parts.
In addition, the units did not have adequate bench stock and there was not
enough assets to service home station aircraft and deployed aircraft at the
three different sites. Forced to requisition parts through normal MAC
channels while deployed, timely arrival of spare parts was not possible. The
first spare part to the deployed location arrived the day the 94th departed
the area of responsibility (AOR). Fortunately, the C-130Hs proved to be
extremely reliable and no aircraft had to be grounded due to lack of spare
parts. Amazingly, all missions were flown with a 100 percent reliability rate.
No sorties were lost.54
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51 Desert Shield After Action Rpt, 94 TAW/MA to 94 TAW/CC, Undated.
52 JULLS Long Rpt, 700 TAS/DO, 24 Apr 91.
53 JULLS Long Rpt, 908 TAG/RMX, 24 Apr 91.
54 Cameron Intvw; Rpt, JULLS, 908 TAG/CC.
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