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initially dictated that their forces would handle the outer perimeter security
and US forces would be responsible for the inner perimeter security.
Eventually, the US was able to convince the UAE to agree to integrate all
the security forces so everyone would know exactly what state of security
really existed. 61
Secure Communications
When the unit arrived, no secure telephones were available. No
on-base telephones existed and the site survey team had requested only
two direct dial lines. The inability to communicate on-site and off-site
impacted on the mission. No field phones or work-arounds other than
runners existed, so there was no combat communications for days, and in
some areas, weeks. That degraded the ability to do simple coordination
on or off the site. The local telephone company declined to install direct
dial outside lines for ten days because the host nation military had not
approved the installation of the instruments and lines. 63
Intelligence
Intelligence specialists had great difficulty in acquiring information.
Getting into the distribution loop for intelligence message traffic on friendly
and enemy orders of battle proved to be almost impossible. The situation
worsened upon deployment to the point where the Intelligence function was
not an addressee on message traffic. Lack of information created a
credibility gap between Intelligence personnel and the aircrews they briefed.
This resulted in great frustration for both groups.63
Medical
Although Col Blair had originally been informed that medical
services would be available at Sharjah, none were. The US Embassy
negotiated with the host nation, however, and obtained the use of a local
hospital for critical emergencies. The unit also established a ten-bed
infirmary with 24-hour service. While no serious medical problems were
encountered, some medical conditions that were treated included: severed
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61 Ltr, 94 SPF/CC to 94 TAW/CC, "After Action Report, Desert Shield," 8
Jan 91; JULLS Long Rpt, 94 SPF/CC, 24 Apr 91.
62 JULLS Long Rpt, 94 CSG/CC, 24 Apr 91.
63 Rpt, JULLS, 94 MAW/DO.
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