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File: aabqn_23.txt
wattage converters, food, forklifts, cars, trucks, fuel, garbage removal,
plastic bags, copiers, telephones, copier supplies, paper and pencils,
etc. 58
Housing
Much of the difficulties experienced by the unit came about
because the UAE committed to provide 40 trailers for billeting, along with
15 latrine trailers. However, the greatly increased requirements for
expanding US and allied forces slowed the UAE's progress, often to a
standstill, of providing the trailers and making them fit for occupancy.
Instead of concentrating on one site, the work progressed slowly at all of
the sites. That, combined with the lack of Prime BEEF support and only
limited Prime RIBS support, resulted in the poor conditions.59
Three weeks after the arrival of the 94th at Sharjah, all 40 billeting
trailers, but only 5 latrine trailers, were on site. Most of the billeting trailers
were operational while only four of the latrine trailers were useable. At one
point, 400 personnel were using six showers and seven toilets (two
American style and five bomb sight). When three toilets overflowed,
personnel showered in three showers in three inches of sewage.
Fortunately, the base population experienced no gastro-intestinal complaints
despite these extremely poor sanitation conditions.60
Security
Security forces were forecast to be in place when the 94th arrived
at Sharjah. Only foreign national guards were available, however, so all US
personnel took turns standing guard. When more personnel arrived,
augmentees had to be trained and security was minimally maintained.
While a survey team had indicated that only 16 security police were needed
to maintain security, that proved to be too small a number to guard base
assets against a significant terrorist threat. Because of that low estimate by
the survey team, it was difficult to argue for more security forces, especially
with the personnel cap the host country imposed on Sharjah. Although the
UAE furnished some security forces, most of their personnel were not well
trained, and the US forces were reluctant to depend upon them. The UAE
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58 See note above.
59 Ltr, 94 CSG/CC to 94 TAW/DO, "After Action Report-Dobbins AFB
Desert Shield," 9 Jan 91; JULLS Long Rpt, 94 CSG/CC, 24 Apr 91.
60 Ibid.
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