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        process. The obvious shortfall of WSMISS and any other on line system we
        used for analysis purposes was the absence of consumption data. Production 
        of sustainment quantities depends on analysis of real consumption to
        determine what we expect to consume. Production of sustainment quantities
        were at best simply guesstimates. Any consumption data gathered to help
        determine realistic sustainment quantities had to be gathered manually by
        phone call and message traffic to each deployed WRSK location, FSS and FSL.
      
        	(2) Action Required: Incorporate into WSMIS real time visibility
        over asset posture in the FSS, FSL and WRSK to include consumption data.
      
        6. WR-ALC/LB Comments:
      
        a Manpower could be more effectively used if we could further automate
        our data reporting requirements.
      
        b. WRSK assets were not sufficient to sustain combat support during
        wartime operations. Depot level repair was the key to providing sustainment
        support. This is especially true when WRSK has not been funded for years.
        We went to war with what was on the shelf. WRSK kit composition will need
        to be reevaluated, especially in the area of tires, props, engines and
        avionics items.
      
        c. We have a poor information flow for aircraft deployed due to various
        commands exercising operational control over various forces. For example,
        the CENTAF/LG Logistics were excellent in providing information about the
        logistics aspect of deployed aircraft; however, it was time consuming to go
        through the LOGSTATs, identify which aircraft the NSN or backorder was
        applicable to and determine which directorate would take action. In essence
        each SPM and item directorate (i e., LY) would query each NSN to see if the
        item was for their action. The backorder should contain which weapon system
        the itch is ordered against to reduce redundant interrogation of the item by
        each SPM and item organization. This would cut down on a lot of duplicated
        effort.
      
       d. All aircraft did not come under the OPCON of USCENTAF; aircraft were
       also deployed under USCINCEUR through COMAIRSOCEUR. This added information
       which was not contained in the CENTAF/LG LOGSTAT, but also duplicated much
       of the information.
      
       e. A conference should to held to determine exactly what information
       the ALCs need to assist the users, and from whom it will be obtained. This
       would reduce message traffic in general, and also reduce duplication of
       effort, i.e., messages were received from JTF Proven Force/J4, AFSOCCENT
       Deployed, COMAIRSOCEUR, 39TACG Incirlik, USCENTAF LG, USCINCENT J4 and
       COMUSAIR containing Redundant information. Information flow is the key. As
       far as operational control was concerned, it was difficult to determine to
       whom an aircraft belonged. This would also assure proper distribution of 
       critical TCTO information.                             
      
       f. We learned the importance of the need to track our assets in the
       supply system, from the time it departs storage, through DS, to the
      
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