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File: aabvb_13.txt
8. WR-ALC/LV Comments
a. Background:
(1) We begin responding to Desert Shield in August 1990 and found
that the air lift movement far exceeded previous contingencies, and we were
not prepared. Pallets and net were a constant critical issue from day one
with vehicle command levies following close behind and eventually being 70
percent of the work load. Bare base and parts support were also critical.
(2) Action Talent
(a) Formed vehicle Desert Shield response team
(b) Issued command levies
(c) Surged pallet and nets
(d) Several urgent firs were written for new pallets and gets
(e) Walked thru many shipping instruction changes
(f) Vigorously worked vehicle MICAPs
(3) Action Required:
(a) Get computer experts to set up a command levy tracking
program.
(b) We could have responded quicker to CENTAF if CENTAF could
have come directly to us without going through AFLC/USAF for command levy
approval; .
b. Commodity Surge
(1) Background: We surged 463L nets in LV. Pallets were not surged
due to a lack of reparables. The surge effort on nets only lasted 60 days
for the same reason--lack of reparables.
(2) Action Taken: Surged 463L cargo nets through our depot level
repair facility until Rep Gens were no longer available to support the effort.
(3) Action Required: since a large supply of reparable pallet/net
assets positioned to support a contingency type requirement would be counter
productive (serviceable assets are preferred) and since overhaul contracts
are always in place, we should never have large reparable quantities of these
assets on hand to surge.
c. HQ AFLC Responsiveness
(1) Background: WR-ALC/LV/CC was in daily contact with HQ AFLC on
many logistics support issues. Our contact in HQ AFLC/MMC/BS validated along
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