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        d. Continuity

          (1) Background: All bases did not activate at the same time, nor
        stay activated together. Problems were encountered obtaining status. In
        some instances it was several days before the right people were aware of a
        message transmitted to them.

       (2) Action Required:, Firm guidance from HQ on what constitutes
       activation/deactivation.

           e. Surge Candidate Identification

       (1) Background: historically, we have depended on WSMIS as a means
       to identify surge candidates. During Phase I, HQ AFSOC, our customer,
       scrubbed this list and deleted/added items based on their actual known WRSK
       shortages/MICAPs. These adjustments continued as the scenarios changed. By
       abase II, our customer bad established a data base of actual demand data and
       this, coupled with shortages, resulted in a very refined surge list for our
       final phase of combat.

       (2) Action Required: WSMIS is only as good as input data at a
       certain point in time. For planning purposes/exercises, this may suffice;
       however, for the "real thing it is imperative that current data be available
       immediately in addition to actual customer identified requirements.

       10. WR-ALC/LK Comments:

            a. Non-Reporting of Missile Data

       (1) Background: Most units were not reporting any missile data
       during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Without missile data, our failure
       analysis is missing crucial data thereby affecting our capability to perform
       missile reliability analysis.

       (2) Action Required: Recommend increased emphasis be placed on the
       criticality of adequate operational reporting to preclude recurrences of the
       problem.

          b. Deployment of MICRO-Computers 

      (1) Background: Most AF TFW munitions deployed units did not take
      essential micro computers with them By not haying micro computers as part
      of their mobility package, the units could not utilize the Tactical Missile
      Records System (TMRS) program to manage their missiles and report flight hour
      data as well as failure data.

      (2) Action Required: Recommend the inclusion of appropriate micro
      computers in deployment packages. 
             
          c. Data Systems Analysis Tools


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