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       hesitant to modify/alter MDS specific ABDR UTCs prior to deployment. 
       Although our deployed C-141 ABDR team performed admirably as an F-15 team,
       this created undue pressure on the team and disappointed expectations on
       behalf of the supported unit. And finery, if we are called upon in the
       future to deploy the number of teams into an AOR as we did in Desert
       Shield/Storm, a CLSS coordinator/advisor attached to the USAF staff in the
       AGO to serve as an advisor to the [G/LGM/LGS staff and balance depot level
       requirements to CLSS capabilities seems wise. 

          c. What have we learned about maintenance concepts? Application of
       maintenance capability to requirements remains valid under the intermediate
       and depot level concepts: Depot level requirements do not disappear in
       combat and in fact become more time sensitive. As a result, there remains a
      valid requirement for depot-skilled, combat-trained, and rapidly-deployable
       CLSS personnel.

               d. Are our CLSS units properly organized? For the moment yes.
       Alignment of CLSS to the weapon Systems supported by the Adds where they are
       resident, proved extremely valuable by allowing CLSS and aircraft product
       directorates to-work together, coordinate, and respond to CENTAF requests for
       -assistance. Some economics may be gained by scaling down the size of our
       teams as rivet work force training develops; however, we must ensure CLSS are
       provided only highly skilled and proved specialists and technicians via AFMPC.
       e. How effective have installation mobility officers been?

       Indispensable for mobility processing, deployment, and return of deployed
       teams.

              f. ABDR Kits

       (1) Background: Practically all 2955th ABDR teams deployed to the
       AOR back experienced shortages in shelf life and bench stock items (i.e.,
       drill bits). Previous thinking that these items would be available from
       supply or maintenance organizations at deployed location(s) have not proved
       correct.

       (2) Action Taken: Shelf life and bench stock requirements
       identified by deployed teams to CLSS were requisitioned by CLSS and shipped.

              (3) Action Required: Post Desert Storm review by HQ AFLC/MATP and
     all CLSS squadrons of ABDR core listing with adjustments as necessary.

           g. Sidearm Training

       (1) Background: Insufficient guidance end procedures exist
       concerning CLSS sidearm training, issue and accountability, transportation
       via commercial means, and allocation of available assets.

       (I) Action Taken: Decisions by CLSS/CC as necessary. Previous
       requests for clarification.

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