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       (1) Background: DOD policy limits the type of shipments qualifying
       for high priority transportation modes to NMCS and requisitions with a short
       required delivery date (RDD) for items processed through the DLA. D033
       procedures require the use of a Job Order Number (JON) in the same field that
       is used to establish the RDD; therefore, the use of the RED is overridden by
       the need to record the JON.

              (2) Action Taken: NONE.  There were no workarounds available.

       (3) Action Required: A review of the policy. Perhaps project code
       could-be key to allowable high priority requisition to D #.

           b. System Data Availability

       (1) Background: As the need to track activity evolved, it was
       apparent that none of the current systems such as D009/MCS/SPALS, D033, WSS,
       and LARTS had the capability to output the necessary Data.

       (2) Action Taken: DSMD/SC programmers developed local programs to
       allow capture of data by project code.

       (3) Action Required: SC&D systems output capability needs review to
       ensure interrogation/aggregation of data by project code is available.

       12.  2955 CUSS Comments:

          a. What have we learned about ourselves?

      (1) Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated that combatant commands remain
      heavily reliant on the ALCs for strategic depot level logistics support and
      CLSS for tactical depot level logistics support for both forward deployed and
      CONUS based organizations during armed conflict. The technical expertise and
      capabilities of O&I-level maintenance organizations were rapidly exceeded
      when faced with aircraft structural damage, crash recovery, ECHO, engineering
      assessments, modifications, and air shipment requirements. CLSS provided a
      quick and effective response in each of these categories as well as providing
      an effective O&I-level augmentation capability both in the AOR and CONUS to
      units either temporarily over-tasked or left abort of personnel due to
      deployments.

      (2) We also learned the knowledge level among deployed units and
      DCMs we supported, concerning CUSS capabilities, varied widely and directly
      impacted the speed and effectiveness of the integration and employment of
      CUSS personnel to meet mission requirements. In this regard, CLSS must
      continue to train and exercise with the units we ~ 11 deploy within the
      future.

      b. What would we do differently or the same? For future deployments, we
        should be hesitant to deploy ABDR UTCs so early in the deployment flow.   
      hotbed, ~p should allow supported units some time to arrive and set up prior
      to our deployment if hostilities are not eminent. Additionally, we should be

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