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         destinations and ULNs in the clear. Classification guidance should be
         consistent throughout all commands. Either all aspects of deployment should
         become unclassified after deployment plan execution or remain classified.
         Periodic re-evaluation is a must to ensure over-classification does not
         occur. All participants must bare ready access to a secure voice network to
         ensure a smooth flow of information.

         e. Not all bases identified as APOEs had access to the global decision
         support system (GDSS) from which to obtain station workload information. The
         GDSS provides information regarding missions scheduled, the ULNs that are to
         be on-the aircraft, the scheduled arrival and departure times, and other
         additional information that is useful to an APOE to schedule personae! shifts
         and prepare cargo loads for shipment. A submodule to the Worldwide Military
         Command and Control System (WWMCCS); Port movement Workload Report (PMWR),
         provide some of the same information, but was not kept updated. Because
         Robins does not have access to GDSS and the Port Movement Workload Report was
         not reliable, 21 Air Force bad to be called daily, and sometimes more often,
         to fax a station workload schedule to the mobility control center. Because
         of other 21 AF command post workload, the fax would sometimes be received up
         to three hours after requested. After receipt, the 21AF planning cell would
         have to be contacted to find out which ULNs went with each mission. Airlift
         Scheduling Messages (ASMs) and port ASMs must he used to ensure those APOEs
         which do not have access to GDSS know what workload to expect and which ULNs
         to put on each mission.

         f. Time Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) information was kept
         available and timely updates were accomplished, for the most part. The
         ability to "pull" from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System
         (WMCCS) an accurate TPFDD in a timely manner was key to ensuring correct
        forces and equipment were available for deployment. During the early part of
        this operation, it was imperative that all participating units received
        update TPFDDs several times a day. This was possible only through the
        constant tape updates done at Wright-Patterson. Some confusion existed when
        more than one plan designator was used, but once the system settled into one
        plan, updating became much easier. Continual update of WWMCCS tapes is
        required to ensure accurate information is provided go deploying units.

       g.  A conscious decision was made not to use airlift scheduling messages
       (ASMs) to transmit airflow and movement information to affect unit mobility
       offices. The following impacts were results of this decision: (1) station
       workload planning was provided verbally and with relatively short notice
       (i.e., 2 to 12 hours): (2) the ULNs to be loaded OD the aircraft were not
       relayed and were at times left up to the deploying unit to determine; (3)
       the APOE departures were unknown to the deploying units, thereby
       report-not-later-than times had to be assumed; and,(4) the units who were to
       use the inbound aircraft were not identified, thereby causing confusion as to
       what to prepare for the aircraft load. When TAC/B3, 21 AP and /or MAC 3
       planning cell personnel were called to verify station workload, a variance in
       the attitude of personnel was noted: some were extremely helpful and others
       lectured that they were not to be bothered. A phone number at which an

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