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	directly on HF to try and obtain a favorable ruling.  This kind
	of behavior was very unprofessional.

              Solution: Any future operations should spell out for aircrews
              whether to use contingency/war rules or peacetime rules for
              weights, etc. Updated information on augmented crews, crew day,
              etc need to be passed to ALCE's.  Crews need retraining on crew
              days, augmented days and crew staging/crew rest. They don't know
              the rules.

                  c. Problem: The crew stage set up at our location was a
               major pain.  Due to very limited available transportation we had                       
              a hard time getting crews to and from the airfield in a timely
              manner. The initial alert window of 6 hours was too short.  We
              were losing too many crews due to no aircraft arrivals in their
              alert window. Aircraft Commanders were constantly trying to
              extend their alert windows, even though message traffic said this
              was against policy. At the time the stage operation was starting
              our tent city was in a tear dawn stage. This caused problem
              with billeting tent apace,  shower hours to meet aircrew needs and
              chow hall hours. KKMC was not a good place to set up a stage
              since Dhahran and King Fahd already had crew stages established.
              We didn't have the proper facilities to handle it.
              
              Solution: It would have made more sense to not have a crew stage
              at KKMC due to others already established in theatre. Crew stage
              establishment decisions should be finalized in theatre, not at
              NAF. They don't know all the variables and the circumstances for
              each location.  When a stage is to be set ups make sure all
              coordination for support has been accomplished prior to beginning
              ops. This was not the case at KKMC.

              4. ALCC:

              a. Problem: Decision making was too restricted at Riyadh.
              On simple issues such as early launches to prevent crewday
              problems, or whether to upload an outbound aircraft, etc., the
              ALCE had to go through several layers or sections to get the
	issues resolved.

             Solution: The ALCE's are capable of coordinating with each other
             to prevent most of these problems. The ALCC needs to give
             deployed ALCE's  more freedom to make these kinds of calls to help
	alleviate some of the load on them.   Be more responsive to ALCE
              suggestions on how best to handle the problems

              b. Problem: On numerous occasions the ALCC would ask for
              information that had been passed to them less than 15 minutes
              earlier. There was too much duplication of effort on their part
              because they couldn't effectively track messages and radio/phone
              information. This cost the ALCEs many lost man-hours to
              retransmit and retype/resend messages each time.

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