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File: 110196_aacis_08.txtdecided that one aircrew would be in building 48, while the other should be in hootch alert, in touch with tanker operation through radio, or runner. The runner being 363rd billeting personnel in tent city. Daily reporting of the wing's flying activity at Al- Dhafra was through the 363rd CAFMS. The only serious delay in the launching of aircraft from Al-Dhafra was the inability of the local Air Traffic Control (ATC) system to handle the extra work load. It wasn't unusual for one of the wing's tankers to wait 30 to 45 minutes for permission to takeoff or land due to ATC satura- tion. Communications Communications at Al-Dhafra consisted of one STU-III secure telephone using commercial telephone lines, a KY-68 secure telephone from the 363rd (which often didn't work), and a field telephone from tanker operations to the 363rd Command Post. For communications with the aircraft, the office used a combined UHF/VHF radio loaned to the wing from the 363rd. For communica- tion on the flightline and with tent city, the wing used six Motorola Hand-Held Saber UHF radios, and a MCX-1000 base station. Unfortunately, these radios didn'tl always work when trying to com- municate with tent city from The base. There was also a radio scanner to track communication between the Al-Dhafra Lower and aircraft. Nevertheless, the STU-III telephone was the primary secure communication link between Al-Dhafra and RAFMildenhall, England; and other locations. The phone was also used for weekly 5-minute morale calls by those assigned to Al-Dhafra. It was the wing's policy to allow everyone assigned 5-minute call to their home base. All seven of the KC-135R aircraft at Al-Dhafra bad two UHF radios and one VHF radio onboard. 8
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