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File: 110196_aacis_08.txt
Page: 08
Total Pages: 10

decided that one aircrew would be  in building 48, while the other
should be in hootch alert, in touch with tanker operation  through
radio, or runner. The runner being 363rd billeting personnel in 
tent city. Daily reporting of the wing's flying activity at Al-
Dhafra was through  the 363rd CAFMS.  The only serious delay in
the launching of aircraft from Al-Dhafra was the inability of the 
local Air Traffic Control (ATC) system to handle the extra work
load. It wasn't unusual for one of the wing's tankers to wait 30
to 45 minutes for permission to takeoff or land due to ATC satura-
tion.
 Communications
	Communications at Al-Dhafra  consisted of one STU-III 
secure telephone using commercial telephone lines, a KY-68 secure
telephone from the 363rd (which often didn't work), and a field
telephone from tanker operations to the 363rd Command Post.  For
communications with the aircraft, the office used a combined
UHF/VHF radio loaned to the wing from the 363rd.  For communica-
tion on the flightline and with tent city, the wing used six
Motorola Hand-Held Saber UHF radios, and a MCX-1000 base station.
 Unfortunately, these radios  didn'tl always work when trying to com-
 municate with tent city from The base. There was also a radio
 scanner to track communication between the Al-Dhafra Lower and
 aircraft. Nevertheless, the  STU-III telephone was the primary
 secure communication link between Al-Dhafra and RAFMildenhall,
 England; and other locations. The phone was also used for weekly
 5-minute morale calls by those assigned to Al-Dhafra. It was the
 wing's policy to allow everyone assigned  5-minute call to their
 home base. All seven of the KC-135R aircraft at Al-Dhafra bad two
 UHF radios and one VHF radio onboard.
  
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