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Lessons Learned

Desert Shield and Desert Storm taught USAF leaders several important lessons, among them the strategic value of overseas bases and forces, the need for unity of command, realistic training, air superiority, superior technology and, above all, quality people.

Desert Shield reminded planners how monumental a job deploying personnel and resources half way around the world could be for the United States. With most potential trouble spots located in the eastern hemisphere, the United States had to deploy forces from stateside bases across the Atlantic o the Pacific. In other words, strategic air and sealift forces were a crucial limiting factor on U.S. strategy. One lesson of the Gulf war was that the united States needed to find ways to lessen that strain.

USAFE's overseas bases and forces offered an important way to do that. The United States did not have to negotiate with European governments for transit rights; the necessary network of airfields and access rights already existed. More than half of the strategic airlift sorties flown during Desert Shield and Desert Storm used USAFE's Spanish bases; one- quarter used Torrejon, a base the command was slated to give up in 1992. The bases not only offered strategic airlifters a gamut of services from crew rest to aircraft maintenance, they also supported employment sorties by tankers, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft.

USAFE also served as an important rear area source of support for deployed forces, as mentioned previously. Much of this support the command could provide itself. The command performed jet engine overhauls needed By U.S. tactical air forces. This meant repaired engines returned faster to-the user and freed transatlantic airlift for other loads. USAFE provided one-third of its munitions stockpile to forces deployed in Southwest Asia and deployed more than $665 million worth of war reserve material there. It also sent 1500 vehicles, while providing 500 ore to support SAC and MAC in Europe. The command pumped 700 million gallons of fuel from 1 August 1990 to 28 February 1991, three ties the normal rate and enough, according to one source, to float an aircraft carrier.

What the command could not do itself, it turned to host nation sources. For example, USAFE let contracts to provide halon gas for F-16 fuel systems, argon for AIM-9 missiles, fire extinguishers, and demineralized water for aircraft cooling systems. Europeans also helped in other ways. Germany,

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