File: aacwr_26.txt
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for example, provided over 1500 trains to move U.S. and other coalition forces to ports of embarkation.

Forward-based forces were also able to respond to the emergency in the Gulf without overloading the already taxed strategic lift system. As helpful as that was, the command had not emphasized that role in its war plans. Traditionally, USAFE had prepared for a full-scale war with the Warsaw Pact in which it would be reinforced from the United States. USAFE's plans thus centered on the idea it would fight "in place" and receive additional forces, not provide them to someone else. When the time came, though, over half its fighter aircraft, one-third of its munitions, and one-sixth of its people left their home bases, nearly all of them deploying out of the European theater.

The aerial campaign against Iraq drove home one lesson airmen had learned in another desert war 4B Years earlier: the importance of unity of command. One of General Schwarzkopf's earliest decisions was vesting command of all coalition air forces in the CENTAF commander, General Homer. He was slower appointing a ground component commander, and operational control of JTF proven Force remained with USEUCOM. USCENTAF had tactical control over the JTF's operations, but in practice exercised that control only loosely.

The JTF taught another important lesson regarding command structure and organization. It was a successful demonstration of the composite wing structure that General McPeak had proposed in the fall of 1990, which would place all forces needed to accomplish a particular mission under one commander. The JTF's 7440th composite Wing controlled fighters, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance aircraft from USAFE, AC, and PACAF; tankers from SAC; and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft from TAC. Having one officer in charge streamlined command and control and focused the - wing's efforts on a single goal. In addition, the composite organization strengthened internal coordination.

All observers agreed with General Homer that Desert Storm underscored the importance of "intense and realistic aircrew training." General Jamerson thought it was the key reason for allied victory. The National Training Center, Red Flag, and realistic deployment exercises had prepared a generation of soldiers and airmen to fight as a team in high-intensity, fast-paced air-land battles. Their training bore fruit in the composite wing at Incirlik and the provisional wings throughout USCENTAF. Furthermore, joint training had been especially beneficial. The Gulf war drove home the lesson

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