COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM

File: 091896_aug96_decls15_0017.txt
Page: 0017
Total Pages: 19

Subject: COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM                           

Box  ID: BX000481

Document Number:          1

Folder Title: COMMAND REPORTS  803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT                                              

Folder Seq #:         20

Unit: ARCENT      

Parent Organzation: CENTCOM     










         ADEQUACIES/IWADEQUACIES OF DOCTRINER TACTICS, EQUIVMENT, ETC.

         1. Normally would not establish five Evacs within a few miles of
         one another - four of which clustered within sight of one another
         under the principle of dispersion. The plan at KKMC, however,
         did create a medical center that permitted mutual support in
         equipment, staffing and provided ease of patient referral and
         physician consultation that was most beneficial.

         2. NBC doctrine, or at least interpretation, resulted in
         excessive masking and donning of MOPP. Rethinking of when to
         move to what level of MOPP is required. more information needs
         to be shared on the impact of desert condition on chemicals to
         assist in assessment of the threat.

         3.  The effectiveness of HoSt Nation support and facilities was
         questionable. Permission to occupy land was slow and frustrating.
         Assignment of an evacuation hospital into a MODA hospital at
         KKMC did not result in 400 beds being available to American
         patients. The difficulty of coordinating admissions by the
         Saudils with the U.S. MRO made identification of available beds
         uncertain. Differences in philosophy and in the practice of
         medicine required many hours of discussion to jointly render
         decisions. While the modern MODA hospital was wonderful to work
         in, the MODA staff were not a significant force multiplier.
         4. Lack of proper lift capacity hurt set up and additional
         equipment and ration deliveries.

         S. Tents need to be supplied with tent pegs that would be for
         appropriate to terrain.

         6. Evac Hospitals require overhead loud speaker systems and hand
         held radios for internal communications copiers and computer
         systems. Their TO&E needs to be changed to reflect this need.


                                COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

 fully complemented or augmented by nurses and
         physicians that were held unproductively at Mobilization stations
         and/or staging areas, developed morale problems that challenged
         the command elements.

         2. If evacuation hospitals are deployed with the expectation of
         receiving and quickly moving patients to other treatment
         facilities, 160 non-environmentally controlled minimal care beds
         are of little value. Since staffing/equipment is not available to
         convert these beds to intermediate or intensive care, Evae Hospitals
         have essentially 200 beds each.
         3. Co-location of an Army medical clearing platoon (2 platoons
         for 24 hour coverage), an ASF and MASP creates an efficiency in
         evacuation of patients. This reduces the need to readmit patients

Document 19 f:/Week-32/BX000481/COMMAND REPORTS 803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT/command report operation desert storm:09139616130233
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-32
Box ID = BX000481
Unit = ARCENT
Parent Organization = CENTCOM
Folder Title = COMMAND REPORTS 803D MEDICAL GROUP COMMAND REPORT
Folder Seq # = 20
Subject = COMMAND REPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM
Document Seq # = 33
Document Date =
Scan Date = 14-AUG-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 13-SEP-1996