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File: 102896_jun96_decls6_0055.txt
Subject: DESERT SHIELD-STORM INTERVIEW
Box ID: BX001608
Unit: 101ST ID
Parent Organization: XVIII CORPS
Folder Title: DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C
Folder SEQ #: 83
Document Number: 2
DSIT-AE-103: COL Roy E. Beauchamp
We've got to train those units. And our active Army units
as well. And how those strategic logistical units have to
fit together to support soldiers on the battlefield, to
understand how the time lines and the urgencies are
associated with that process. It's a very complex, complex
business.
We have to look at our materiel management centers, our
movement control centers in the corps, document those. And
we've got to find ways to train those elements in the kind
of conditions that we will encounter on the battlefield.
We've got to put people in those key positions and those
division chiefs and those commodity managers who really,
truly understand the functions that they are manage.
Because they have a pervasive impact on the whole corps. If
you've got for example--as an example, and I am not
referring to any specific case in Saudi Arabia--but if
you've got, for example, in the corps materiel management
center, let's say, a tank-automotive division chief and
we're classifying stuff.
MAJ HONEC: Uh-huh.
COL BEAUCHAMP: And that guy has responsibility for managing
the Class IX function in the whole corps--the requisitions
and the repair parts and the information, the status and all
that business for the whole corps, flows through that
manager. He has responsibility for Class IX. It has a
pervasive impact on the whole corps' operation.
So we've got to put people in those positions, in those
functional centers--in the material management centers and
movement control centers--who really understand their
business and understand the impact in the relationship
between the corps materiel management center and the Jones
Support Supply Base in the corp@, and how that fits into the
retail operation of the corps. A critical relationship.
And we've got to delve into those logistically and gear our
training programs for captains and majors and our
logisticians to be able to deal with those kinds of
situations.
We also have to recognize, I think, in the Army and
deal with the fact that you can't sustain ALO-1 consumers
with ALO-3 or ALO-4 providers over the long term. You can't
put a maneuver element out and put them at 110 percent
strength, and tell the unit that's a 70 percent strength to
support those units indefinitely. Because if you start with
an ALO-3 unit--logistics unit--by the time you take out the
security and sick call and other things, you may end up with
52
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Document 64 f:/Week-22/BX001608/DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C/desert shield-storm interview:10019616504029
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001608
Unit = 101ST ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C
Folder Seq # = 83
Subject = DESERT SHIELD-STORM INTERVIEW
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 01-OCT-1996