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File: 102896_jun96_decls6_0056.txt
Subject: DESERT SHIELD-STORM INTERVIEW
Box ID: BX001608
Unit: 101ST ID
Parent Organization: XVIII CORPS
Folder Title: DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C
Folder SEQ #: 83
Document Number: 2
DSIT-AE-103: COL Roy E. Beauchamp
& unit that's not operating at 70 percent strength or 75
percent strength.
MAJ HONEC: Good point.
COL BEAUCHAMP: He may be at 50 percent strength when you
get to the hands-on. Fifty percent in severe and very
complex functions where there's not a lot of
interchangeability in the units. You can't take a fuel
handler and say, okay, today you are going to be a mechanic.
There's a lot of diversity in those units.
MAJ HONEC: I understand.
r-OL BEAUCHAMP: The Army has to come to grips with that.
We've got to decide what we need in the structure and we've
got to resource it. We can't do it cheaply because if you
do it cheaply, then you are going to be spending a lot more
money and time and effort in the long run. Because--and a
lot more lives in the long run as well--because of this
unique and special and very close relationship that exists
now between consumers and providers in this structure.
Harking back once again to the teeth, the muscle and
the sinew. If you've got good solid teeth but no muscle,
then you can't be effective. If you've got good muscles and
no sinew, you can't be effective. If you've got good
muscles and sinew and no teeth, you can't be effective. So
there has to be a very carefully balanced appraisal of the
whole structure in order to give us the combat capability
and give us sustaining capability to fight, not Itil we win
the battle, but to win the war. That's the point that I'm
trying to make.
You can't support ALO-1 consumers with @TO-3 providers
for an indefinite period. And that was a problem for us in
Saudi Arabia. We didn't begin until very late in the
process--begin the authority to upgrade our authorized level
of organization to ALO-1 or ALO-2. As it turned out in the
group, we never got over about 84 percent, 85 percent
strength in the group, the whole period ... when we began to
redeploy back to the United States. And the units I was
supporting were operating at 100 percent-plus strength--105
to 110 percent, 115 percent in some cases--in some areas.
Obviously a tremendous strain on the system because all
those guys have to eat. All those guys need clothes and all
those guys need food, showers. They need fuel. They need
ammunition. They need transportation support. They need
maintenance support. They need medical support.
So the Army has to come to grips with that. We have to
have a balanced appraisal of what has to be done. And I'm
not talking about gold plating any part of the system. I'm
not talking about gold-plating logistics. I'm talking about
53
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Document 64 f:/Week-22/BX001608/DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C/desert shield-storm interview:10019616504029
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001608
Unit = 101ST ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = DSS 101ST ABN DIV INTERVIEW CDR 101ST SG - C
Folder Seq # = 83
Subject = DESERT SHIELD-STORM INTERVIEW
Document Seq # = 2
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 01-OCT-1996