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File: 123096_sep96_decls23_0042.txt
Subject: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASES OF IMPORTANCE
Unit: OTSG
Parent Organization: HSC
Box ID: BX003203
Folder Title: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASES 1991PORTABLE FIELD PERSONNEL SHOWER SYSTEMS
Document Number: 1
Folder Seq #: 88
agents. This may occur hours or days after the attack. Toxins may cause direct pulmonary
INI'RODUCTION toxicity or be absorbed and cause systemic toxicity. Toxins are frequently as potent or more
potent by inhalation than by my other route. A unique clinical picture may sometimes be
Biological warfare is tire use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living seen which is not observed by other routes [e.g., pulmonary edema after staphylocmcal
organisms to produce drain or disease in lium@s, animals, or plants. In spite of the 1972 enterotoxin B (SEB) exposure]. Mucous niembmes, including conjunctivae, are also
Biological Weapons Convention prohibiting the use of biological warfare agents, concern Vulnerable to many biological warfare agents. Physical protection is then quite important and
over compliance remains. Information from rather offensive programs clmrly has use of full-face masks equipped with small-particle filters (e.g, M17-Al, M40, M43)
demonstrated the vulnerability of inadequately protected troops to such agents. This assumes a high degree of importance.
experience, coupled with advances in modem technology, makes it possible that allied forces
may be exposed to biological weapons. Characteristics of many live agents and toxins make Other routes for delivery of biological wmpons we thought to be less important
them potentially effective for offensive military use. These agents can provide a rmdily than inhalation, but are nonetheless potentially significant. Contamination of food and water
available and effective weapon in the hands of terrorists as well as assassins. supplies, either purposefully or incidentally after n aerosol biological warfare attack,
Section I of this document (below) provides general background information and represents a livud for infection or intoxication by ingestion. Assurance that food and water
principles applicable to some biological thrmts. Outlined in Section 11 is an assessment of supplies are free from contamination should be provided by appropriate preventive-medicine
our current capability to respond to several of the rmognized thrmt agents. A common authorities in the event of an attack.
format is used to enable rapid consolidation of capabilities by response arm (e.g., specific at
laboratory diagnosis, therapy, prophylaxis). Section III contains information pertinent to Derm : Intact skin provides an excellent barrier for many but not all biological
specimen collection and processing for the specific laboratory diagnosis of biological warfare agents. Mucous membranes and abraded, or otherwise damaged, integument cm, however,
threat agents. Section IV provides a review of clinical fmtures distinguishing chemical allow for passage of some bacteria and toxins, and should be protected in the event of an
neurointoxications front botulism and SEB, and pulmonary syndromes that can be sect] in attack.
exposures. GENERAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES
SECTION I Ph sical Pr t tion: The most effective and most important prophylaxis in defense
against biological warfare agents is physical protection. Pr@ Shifting exposure of the
respiratory tract and mucous membranes (to include the conjunctivae) to infectious and/or
ROUTES OF EXPOSURE toxic aerosols through use of a full-face respirator will obviate the need for additional
inhalation: Biological weapons are dispersed as aerosols by one of two basic measures. To this end, the currently fielded chemical masks (e.g., M17-Al and new M40
mechanisms: point- or line-sourcc dissemination. Unlike some chemical threats, aerosols of and M43) are protective if properly fitted and in use at the time of exposure.
agents disseminated by line-source munitions (e.g., sprayed by low-flying aircraft or Decontamination, Protection of Health Cue Personnel: Derm2d exposure from a
speedboat along the coast) do not lmve h@dous environmental residua (although @ttirax
spores may persist and could pose a h@d near the dissemination line). On the other hand, suspected biowufue attack should be treated by soap and water decontamination. This
enerator, bomblets, should follow my needed use of chemical dwontaminmts but should be prompt. Secondary
etc.) are more apt to produce ground contamination, but only in the immediate vicinity of contamination of medical personnel from clothing, etc. of exposed soldiers may be
dissemination. Point-source munitions lmve @ obvious signature that alerts the field important, particularly from casualties recently exposed near the dissemination source where
commander that a biological warfare attack has occurred. Because Point-source munitions large particle deposition may occur. Since it will be difficult to distinguish those soldiers
always leave an agent residue, this evidence @ be exploited for diagnostic purposes. exposed near the source from those contaminated some distance away, proper physical
Aerosol delivery systems for biological warfare agents most commonly generate protection of hmith care providers or other persons handling exposed personnel should be
invisible clouds with particles or droplets of < 10 micrometers (Jim). They can remain maintained until decontamination is complete. This applies to chemical exposures as well.
suspended for extensive periods. The major risk is pulmonary retention of inhaled particles. Clinical laboratory samples for toxin-exposed subj@ts can be dealt with routinely.
To a much lesser extent, particles may adhere to an individual or his clothing. The effect .ve Patients showing signs of pneumonic plague generally should be considered h=dous, as
bacilli by aerosol. Exposure of health care providers to open
absence of @ effective r@t-time alarm system or direct observation of an attack, the first lesions or blood from "thm patients could result in cutaneous anthrax. Vegetative forms of
clue would be mass casualties fitting a clinical pattern compatible with one of (lie biological anthrax do not pose a threat of aerosol dissemination from blood or during autopsy
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Document 52 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASES 1991PORTABLE FIELD PERSONNEL SHOWER SYSTEMS/diagnosis and treatment of diseases of importanc:12179609281524
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASES 1991PORTABLE FIELD PERSONNEL SHOWER SYSTEMS
Folder Seq # = 88
Subject = DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASES OF IMPORTANC
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996