ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOrATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                       37


   I decided early on that the highly centralized command-and-control aspects
of the FSSG would not work well over such distances, and that the proper
solution was to break the organization into two groups--one for general support,
and the other for direct support of tactical units. I built a small, streamlined staff
(with a colonel in charge) for each group.   This setup left the FSSG head-
quarters and me free to deal with the host nation and the other services; while
exerting overall supervision over the two groups.  Aviation support, among
other things, fell to the general support group, except for those aviation elements
deployed far forward with the ground forces.      The direct support group
commander--Colonel Alex Powell--had entered the theater of operations in
command of Brigade Service Support Group-7.    He took his BSSG-7 staff and
shifted his focus to direct support of the ground forces, collocating his head-
quarters with that of Major General [J. M.] Mike Myatt, commanding the 1st
Marine Division.  Even though Colonel Powell was one of my subordinate
commanders, he became General Myatt's     advocate for resources and mobility
--one of the keys to our success in operating over such great distances.
   Before the 2d Marine Division arrived in-country in its reinforcing role, I
had a phone conversation with Brigadier General      [C.C.]     Chuck  Krulak,
commanding the 2d FSSG.    We agreed to continue the general support/direct
support arrangement.  My 1st FSSG headquarters would remain the overall
logistics coordination agency, in a general support role.  The 2d FSSG would
run the forward logistics battle.  At the height of the Desert Storm ground
action, our supply lines were stretched more than 250 miles from Al Jubayl. I
don't know how we could have succeeded without General Krulak and his FSSG
in the direct support role, supplying the ammo, fuel, and water--the biggest lo-
gistical drivers of combat operations.

Proceedings: By the time the ground attack got under way,          we had the
equivalent of another Marine Expeditionary Force afloat off Kuwait, poised for
a major ampilibious assault. Did you have plans to support such an amphibious
operation, if required?

Brabham: We sure did.    From the day they first appeared in the Gulf, our
amphibious forces received continuous support from our FSSG in Saudi Arabia.
For example, we brought tanks from the amphibious forces to Al Jubayl,
performed required maintenance on them, and sent them back to the ships. We
provided secondary depots for Major General Harry Jenkins, the Commanding
General, 4th MEB, in Oman or wherever he needed them.
   Had there been an amphibious assault, the real logistical drivers would have
been--once again--ammo, fuel, and water. We had a coordinated plan to support
the amphibious forces along the lines already established: the 1st FSSG would
pick up general support responsibilities and General Jenkins's own combat ser-
vice support forces would become his direct support element in country. I had
a lot of meetings with Colonel Jim Doyle, the embarked brigade service support
group commander, and we were wired together pretty tightly.