38                                      U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

Proceedings: Getting into Desert Storm itself--were you amazed by the swiftness
of the victory? You must have had worst-case plans for a longer period, with
more casualties.

Brabham: Yes, we were pleasantly surprised. I was always concerned about its
turning into a real slugfest, and it bad great potential to do just that.  We could
never discount the massive amounts of arms and material the Iraqis had in
Kuwait.  What we didn't know for certain was the strength of their will to fight.
That's almost impossible to tell until the fight begins.
    General Knilak and I decided that we needed a substantial surge capability
to carry our committed    ground forces  through any period of heavy        fighting
--again, the drivers were ammo, fuel, and water.    We planned to position ten
days' worth of all classes of supply right up front with General Krulak, and in
one intensive two-week period we managed to move all that gear up to a newly
constructed combat service support area, way out in the middle of the desert,
where it could best support the barrier and minefield breaching plans of the two
Marine divisions.    General Krulak called it "Al Khanjar"--the dagger.
    We set a goal of staging ten days' worth of supplies and equipment at Al
Khanjar, and General Boomer agreed.      Then we began a most intense buildup
period, which used every imaginable means of transport.     In addition to our
normal load-haulers,    we used tactical vehicles--the logistics vehicle system
["Dragon Wagon"]       vehicles,  in particular. We even   leased        commercial
tractor-trailers.  At one point, I had more than 1,000 40-ton tractor-trailers
leased from throughout the Gulf, as well as Saudi Arabia.      Reserve motor
transport Marines drove them, for the most part.
    We got tremendous support from the Air Force C-i 30 transport pilots, who
flew virtually every mission we requested.  Chuck Krulak built an expeditionary
airstrip for them at the forward combat service support area, and we augmented
the C-i 30 hops with extensive use of Marine CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters. We
even used Army boats--in particular, their large LCU-2000 landing craft and
logistic support vessels--to ferry material up the Gulf coast to Ras al Mish'ab.
From there, it was a relatively short leg by helicopter and truck to the forward
support area.    At the same time, we were establishing an extensive medical net-
work--a casualty-handling chain between the forward base, the fleet hospitals,
and the evacuation airfields.  All in all, it took an incredible two weeks of effort
to prepare that forward staging base for the two-division attack through the
minefields. We really loaded it up-4o ensure that we would have staying power
if a slugfest started right away. Chuck Krulak can give you some more details.
He built the thing and we just tried to keep him supplied-no small task for either
of us.

Proceedings: With many combat units widely dispersed across the desert, and
the potential for mass casualties ever present, you obviously couldn't replicate
the Vietnam medical evacuation system of relying extensively on dustoff hel-
copters to get the wounded to medical battalion hospitals far in the rear . .