ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                         87

transportation assets, and everything else that was required to unload the MPS
squadrons.   He bad quickly staked things out for us.
   Getting unpacked, of course, was just the initial task. Our primary concern
was setting up a defense to protect the Al Jubayl complex-the heart of the Saudi
industrial area.  Most of the oil fields are in and around Jubayl, along the coast
and to the north.    And Jubayl houses a huge petrochemical complex, as well
as a large, modern port.     So establishing that defense was the overriding
concern.

Proceedings: At the time, did you sense a strong enemy threat?    The 7th MEB
had a lot of combat power, but was still relatively small, compared to forces the
Iraqis had in the region.

Boomer: It was small--compared to what the Iraqis already had in Kuwait and
what they continued to bring down from Iraq, as they consolidated their position
in Kuwait.   From our perspective, it made sense for the enemy to attack--and
we planned for that. We took the threat very seriously. I have been asked many
times if we could have defended with the forces we had in place initially., My
answer--then and now: "Yes, but it would have been one hell of a battle.

Proceedings: It appears that the MPS system really proved itself, filling the gap
between the first airlifted trip-wire force and the arrival of the first heavy
armored and mechanized units

Boomer: Yes, MPS did fill the gap--without question.      The 7th MEB was the
first force on the ground that offered a credible defense against mechanized
attack.  The Army airborne troops who got there first were good, but were too
lightly armed and supplied to stop tanks for very long. The quick arrival of the
7th MEB and the MPS squadron must have put Saddam Hussein on notice that
our President was serious about defending Saudi Arabia, for openers.
   The MPS system worked exactly as planned.   John Hopkins would certainly
tell you that his earlier MPS deployment exercises paid off in spades.       In
general, we knew exactly what to do, and things went smoothly.       I wouldn't
change any of it--except to have moved the Maritime Prepositioning Force
sooner, which I think General [A. M.] Gray [the Commandant of the Marine
Corps] had been advocating.

Proceedings: Jim Brabbam said that the original defensive perimeter 30 miles
Out from Al Jubayl expanded to roughly 80 miles out, as more Marine units
arrived.   When, in this process, did you shift gears and begin to think about
offensive action?

Boomer:    As early as October,   we really began to think and talk among
ourselves--about going on the offense.   I believe that any group of prudent
commanders would have done the same thing.   We didn't know for certain that