88                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

we were going into the attack, but we knew that was a possibility--so we began
to do some preliminary planning for that possibility.

Proceedings: Was a rotation plan with 2d Marine Division units pretty well
firmed up by then?

Boomer: Early on, we began looking at a key question: If we wound up with
a long-term commitment, and had to rotate our troops, how would we do it?
General Gray and I firmly agreed on a key point:    If we did not assume the
offensive and instead began a rotation system, we would rotate by units--not
individuals, as we did in Vietnam.  Meanwhile, while we were thinking about
this, the 1st Marine Division units continued arriving and we kept pushing out
the defensive perimeter.  Rotation planning was one of several things going on
at the time.

Proceedings:  After the President's decision to present a credible offensive
capability to Saddam Hussein, the 2d Marine Division--among others--began
arriving, and I MEF started to evolve into a Corps-level command. Was major
compositing or headquarters reshuffling required to make the transition?

Boomer: Not really.  The I MEF headquarters continued to grow as the MEF
got bigger, and the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters continued to grow as
[Major] General [Royal] Moore absorbed the bulk of Marine Corps aviation.
Any early concepts of an extremely lean headquarters went out-the window; as
we kept growing, we needed more staff support.    At that point, "compositing"
was really a melding of staffs and addition of specialists from all over the
Marine Corps. The real compositing took place when the 7th MEB headquarters
composited into the I MEF headquarters.
    We probably should have renamed ourselves the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Corps.  General Gray mentioned that, but other things were happening at the
time and I didn't push for it.     He was right, though--"Corps" was more
appropriate.

Proceedings: Speaking of "compositing --its been suggested that the term is
inaccurate, that what actually occurs is a breaking down of staffs that are later
mix-mastered into a larger staff at a higher echelon.  This is difficult, even
under ideal circumstances to say nothing of combat.  Thinking back over your
compositing experience, is there anything you would do differently?

Boomer: Yes.   The Marine Corps has tended to treat compositing as something
relatively simple to execute.  That's not so.  The human dynamics alone can
create significant problems in the process. So we need to devote more organized
thought and effort to the question of compositing.
    For example: A deploying MEB's officers need to understand early that they
will not remain a brigade forever; they will composite into a MEF staff. They
need to look forward to their next jobs. Compositing is not a tearing down; in