ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBUOGRAPHY                                          89

reality, it is a building process--and that's the way they should look at it.
Instead of grieving over the loss of their old identity, they should be actively
seeking their new warfighting identity.
   Frankly, the sooner the term `brigade" leaves our vocabulary, the happier
I'll be. I like the concept of the MEF (Forward), instead. It makes people look
ahead, not back. If they realize that they are part of the MEF that is coming in
behind them, they may start thinking harder about how to help the MEF build
toward combat readiness. A shift of identity is required.  After Desert Storm,
anyone who thinks that a MEF does not have a fighting headquarters hasn't been
paying attention.

Proceedings: Once you started offensive planning in earnest, the breaching
operation--later praised as truly classic by General Schwarzkopf--came to the
fore. What were your original thoughts along that line, and when did you begin
thinking in terms of a twodivision breach, instead of a single-:livision breach
followed by a passage of lines?

Boomer: We were impressed initially by the speed with which the Iraqis erected
their barrier line across Kuwait. We probably drew some erroneous conclusions
at the time, assuming the Iraqis to be stronger than they really were.  As time
passed, our intelligence began to show that--while significant, with a lot of land
mines--the barriers were not as refined as we once had thought.      They could
have been a lot better. Each day, we would find more pieces to the puzzle until
we became confident that we could get through--although we remained very
concerned about the riskiness of the operation.
   At the outset, we did not have all the heavy breaching and mine-clearing
equipment we needed.    I think that will always be the case for the Marine
Corps, because that stuff is hard to haul around on a routine basis.  When you
are faced with a special breaching problem, you have to send for the right gear.
In our case, [Brigadier General] Bob Tiebout and MCRDAC [Marine Corps
Research, Development and Acquisition Command] did a great job of gathering
heavy equipment from around the world and getting it to us.
   You need a lot of equipment for a division-sized breach, because of the
requirement for redundancy.   You are going to lose some gear when you push
through the minefields--and that, of course, is exactly what happened. When the
2d Marine Division arrived in country, we still had only enough breaching
equipment for one division. But the gear continued to come in, until it became
apparent that we would have enough for two divisions--so we changed plans.
   Getting the equipment was just the first step.  Our Marines had to train with
it, and learn to use it well.  The 1st Marine Division had been training for
several months, working against obstacles we constructed that were noticeably
tougher than the Iraqi barriers.  The 2d Marine Division had the benefit of
watching over the 1st Division's shoulder and telescoping their own breaching
training, but they still didn't have much time to become truly proficient.
   About two weeks before the ground attack began, however, [Major General]
Bill Keys [commanding the 2d Marine Division] came to me and said, "I can do