ANTHOLOGY AND ANN(YrATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                         117

Bill Keys allowed me to have those vehicles for set periods of time so that I
could run them out there purely for an air look at the battlefield. For example,
the RPVs caught some SA~s coming down the road to Jabar and we knocked
them stiff.
   We had a couple of slewing problems that we didn't pick up right away, but
we got those corrected.

Proceedings: Were these Pioneers, specifically, or Pointers?

Moore: These were primarily Pioneers.

Proceedings: The RPVs are, of course, division assets.  Do you think that's the
best place for them?

Moore: They really became more Marine Expeditionary Force [MEF] assets
than division, because we had two divisions out there.  But they were too much
oriented toward the ground.  We found that we have to share the information,
and depending on the flow of the battlefield, it may be 80% in support of the
air and 20% in support of the ground, and then as the ground combat starts to
go, it may be 90% in support of the ground and 10% in support of the air. You
have to weigh where you are on the battlefield, and we did that fairly well.

Proceedings: How about battle damage assessment (BDA)?

Moore: Getting BDA out of pilots is very, very tough.       We put enormous
pressure on the crews: "You go right to the S-2 [intelligence section].   Grab a
bottle of water and sit down with that guy and not only tell him what you did
on the battlefield, but tell him what you saw on the battlefield."  That became
the most critical asset of the whole campaign.    We computerized this infor-
mation and hot reports were funneled to us.
   One day we caught a battalion of Iraqi artillery moving out of the oil fires
to take the 2d Division under fire, and we hammered them.   We diverted attack
airplanes, and diverted F/A-iSDs to direct them.    We did this based on pilot
reports. It took an enormous amount of discipline.
   Most important, the air crews could tell us how well we were doing on the
battlefield. As you go through a campaign like this, you really start to get a feel
for it, like you do in a football game.  You develop a feel for how well it's
going, your passing game is going good, your running game is not going worth
a damn.  The pilot reports gave us a feel for the battlefield, and I could then go
to Boome\~, to Myatt, to Keys, and tell them, "This is what I feel is on the
battlefield.
   Going into Kuwait City is a good example.     The last day we had the Iraqis
breaking contact with us. We didn't know if they were breaking contact to get
out of there or breaking contact to actually go into Kuwait City and go into a
very nasty battle--a house-to-house evolution. Because we knew the battlefield-
-all of us had a feel for it--we were able to give General Boomer a "Wait, let