118                                    U.S. MARINES IN ThE PERSIAN GULF, 19901991

them disengage, because they are running, and they are flowing through Kuwait
International [Airport].   Let them go, because that's the best possible world for
the artillery, tank, and air guys, and don't worry as much that they're going to
stop and put up a fight in Kuwait City."   Luckily, that's what happened. That
is the type of feel for the battlefield.

Proceedings: The Iraqi fighter threat went away fairly early. How much did all
the antiaircraft artillery [AAA] and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in your area
of operations influence the tactics that were used by fixed-wing and helicopters?

Moore: You're right, the air-to-air threat did go away early.  In fact, it lasted
probably only two hours or so.     That is about what we thought was going to
happen.    We thought, if they put up their best fight, this whole air-to-air
campaign would last probably a day and a half.
    I base that on the fact that on 24 August 1990, the Marines picked up
responsibility for a 24-hour-a~ay, seven-days-a-week combat air patrol (CAP)
over the Gulf. We provided CAP for our Marines all the way up to 16 January
1991 [the beginning of the air campaign] and never dropped a sortie.   We did
that initially for two reasons.  First, the Navy was outside the Gulf and was
having a difficult time covering the Northern Gulf CAP; the Air Force was out
to the west.  Second, and most important, we put a CAP over our Marines.   As
we went through that CAP and that long process, we got several chances to see
the Iraqis come down [south], and we got within seven or eight miles of them,
and saw their tactics and how aggressive they were. We had electronic airplanes
out there. We had all 12 EA~Bs there. They were running up and down. We
had the Air Force F4G Wild Weasels out there with us at the same base.     So
we knew how this guy was going to react.    I've got to tell you
--and I'm not trying to be smart--we didn't get any surprises out of him from
an air standpoint.
    The Iraqis really are trigger pullers; you saw all that on CNN.  They just
unloaded and filled the sky with flak and SAMs.   Keep in mind that less than
1% of my pilots had ever seen combat.      That surprised me, but the time has
gone by, and in MAG-1 1, with 13 squadrons, only four Marines were Vietnam
veterans.   So when these young kids go up there and they've got an SA6, an
SA-2, or whatever shot at them, they come back and it's kind of tough for me
to tell them, "Hey, don't worry about it.   That was all unguided."    When a
missile goes over the top of your canopy, you get concerned.   The discipline in
these young men was just fantastic.
    We had not dropped a lot of real bombs in Southwest Asia.    We knew we
could have the high sanctuary, so we came in high.   Our pilots would rock in
as high as 30,000 feet, coast on downhill, pick up the target, acquire, and pull,
and get out of there. We bottomed out at 12,0(X) feet; then 10,000; then 8,000.
As we started to beat down the air defense system and the Iraqis started to run
out of amInunition, we were then able to start coming in lower, stay in the area
a little longer, and work the battlefield.