ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOrATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                        125

Proceedings: Did the EA~Bs jam close to the front lines?    Do we need some
jamming capability in helicopters?

Moore: Every time the artillery guys went on an artillery raid, we went up there
and supported them with the EA~B against counter-battery fire.    We tracked
every radar that could possibly be on the battlefield and passed that information
on.  When the 1st Division fired--and they did some great artillery work--we
had an EA~B constantly on station alerting that guy.      We had high-speed
antiradiation missile [HARM] shooters to take the radar down, and we put that
thing together very well.     The EA~Bs are scarce assets; we had only 12 of
them.
   Do we need to put jammers into helicopters for the close-in battle?  I don't
think we do.   I think as long as we keep the focus on making sure that the
EA~B is a Marine air-ground task force asset, and the air guy will get down
and talk to the ground guy to determine what he needs, I think we're in good
shape in that area.

Proceedings: What were the rules of engagement? How did Marines operate
with all those attack helicopters at night? Did the Marine Corps use any different
procedures?

Moore: Unfortunately, we have at least two cases where we believe the Marine
Corps had blueon-blue engagements. One air-to-ground for sure, and there may
be another, a HARM shot, that we're still investigating.  In any scenario, one
such encounter is unacceptable to any commander.    But you need to understand
the battlefield.
   We put enormous time and energy into the blueon-blue, both air and
ground. It's to everybody's credit that we had no blue~n-blue air engagements,
let alone midair collisions.    I've got to tell you, we had enormous numbers of
airplanes running around up there.    From my own experience, I can tell you it
was busy.
   But the battlefield was such that people lost situational awareness.  When
they did that, then we had trouble and the system broke down, unfortunately.

Proceedings: Were you under positive control when dropping within so many
meters of the friendlies? Were people cleared in to hunt for the enemy?

Moore: Of all the missions we had, the one I am aware of is where an A-6 hit
an artillery group that was coming south; the A~ pilot and bombardier-navigator
just missed that they were south of Kuwait and not north.     You say, 1,Hell,
that's pretty easy to tell.'  But when you're making the final attack, you've got
the radar narrowed down.        He really thought he was about eight miles from
where he was.    That's a very unfortunate thing.      He just lost situational
awareness.  He was eight miles from wbere he really should have been, and he
was south of the border instead of north of the border.