126                                       U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 19901991

    But the rest were all positive control.   Here's what we did in the 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing.  Every hour on the hour we got hold of our liaison guys for the
1st and 2d Division and found out exactly where they were.       We put a flash
message out on the wire, and we called each one of the groups and told them
where everybody was.     Most important, for any outside stuff, such as pilots
reporting that they saw tanks north of this line (and they were our tanks), we
tried~to mark them as best we could with panels and everything else.
    What we've got to do now is work out some systems--identification friend
or foe [1FF], flashing lights, beacons--to make sure that we can identify troopS
on the ground.

Proceedings: Were you supporting units other than the Marine Corps?

Moore: On G-Day we flew more close air support missions than anybody else
in theater.  We were only about ten missions short of the Air Force on the
second day of the war.
    We supported primarily at that time the 1st and 2d Divisions, and on
occasion we would send guys over to help the Saudis on our right flank.    So,
in essence, we were supporting those three.        What we did, we built an air
command     and control  system       that put two airplanes in the stack every
seven-and-a-half minutes. Marines, as you know, try to husband assets, and we
tried to make sure that they were quickly catapulted forward to one of the two
divisions.  If they couldn't use them, we handed them off to the OV-10s for
short battlefield interdiction, and if they couldn't use them, we'd catapult them
forward.
    We could turn up the wick, and we did on the last day of the war.      We
turned up so that eight airplanes showed up every 15 minutes and we ran them
through that system.  If we got Air Force or Navy airplanes in the system, we
said, "Okay, you go to this forward point and you go here, there, everywhere."
We built the system and we rehearsed it before we started the air campaign and
everybody was familiar with it.       Most important, we briefed everybody: every
battalion commander, every company commander, the A-i0 squadrons, the
Aegis cruisers, the AWACS. Everybody was briefed on the total plan, what the
1st Division was going to do, what the 2d Division was going to do, what I was
going to do, how support would flow.

Proceedings: I believe the Marine Corps lost five AV-8Bs.      Four, I was told,
were to infrared (IR) missiles; one was at the time undetermined.    Of course,
the Harrier has the nozzles there under the wing, instead of tail feathers, so if
it takes a hit, it's in a tough place.  How about the vulnerability of the Harrier?

Moore: First, we did not lose five; we lost four, and the 4th Marine Expedition-
ary Brigade,  which was under the Naval Commander,            Central Command
control, lost one on the last day.       You're right, four of them were hit by
shoulder-fired IR missiles. The cause of one of the losses is undetermined, but
I think that probably was also shoulder-fired. You have the hydraulics, the fuel,