ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                         143

us, but the false alarms were probably triggered by the heavy smoke from the
oil fires.  We were not sure even after the cease-fire that the Iraqis might not
do something dumb to try to pay us back for what had been for them a very
embarrassing situation.

Proceedings: What concerned you most out there?

Myatt: I think the thing that we were most concerned with was preparing to
breach the obstacles, because we couldn't find in our history where anybody had
gone through the kinds of obstacles that we expected. That the obstacles weren't
as sophisticated as we expected was a blessing. We worried about those obsta-
cles, getting through and building speed and trying to get in behind the Iraqis.
   I told my folks: "We're not going to fight anybody we don't have to fight."
We wanted always to try to find a flank someplace, to get in behind them.    We
wanted to use that period from the beginning of the air campaign until we
started the ground campaign as the time to start attacking their will.   The 3d
Marine Aircraft Wing air is what did it for us going into Kuwait, not JFACC
[Joint Force Air (component commander)].
   That was a key part of it, but I also believe the combined arms raids that we
conducted was a part of it, and--about 25 January--we hurt a brigade head-
quarters of the Iraqis so badly with our artillery that it prompted a counter-at-
tack. That included the one that went into Khafji on the morning of 30 January.
   The night of the Khafji battle, there were really three attacks.  One was the
battalion of tanks that came out of Kuwait through Umm Hujul, which hit us.
The second one was a smaller-size force that came out of the Al Wafra down
into Saudi Arabia and hit the 2d Division. The third was the brigade that went
into Khafji unopposed because the Coalition forces did not have anything up that
far forward, except for some of our reconnaissance teams.
   So here we have Colonel Turki, who commanded the Saudi Arabian King
Abdul Aziz Brigade, and a major from the Omani forces who were meeting at
a place called Long Rifle, a checkpoint.  John Admire walked in and they were
discussing whether or not they would counterattack the Iraqis. John Admire told
them that we still had two recon teams in there and that we would support them
with air and artillery and whatever had to be done. Colonel Thrki turned to him
and said, "That's enough for me.~    So they conducted an initial probe with a
planned withdrawal to ascertain the enemy dispositions. Then they conducted
a very successful counterattack.
   We knew that the Iraqis weren't as good as everybody had portrayed them
to be at that point.  John Admire knew those two commanders, and there's no
substitute for knowing who you're going to fight with.

Proceedings: So based on Admire's support, they said, "We're ready to go?"

Myatt: Yes, I think it's because with each of those brigades we also had
supporting liaison teams and Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison teams [ANGLICO]. We
all knew each other. The Coalition business isn't just common procedures; more