usmcpersiangulfdoc1_156.txt
144 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 199~1991
important is you've got the interface with your liaison teams. I think ANGLICO
is a key element in that. Cross4raining, where we had Marines going up and
training those Saudi folks in artillery, engineering, mine warfare-that was
important too.
Proceedings: What made things work for you?
Myatt: I rank it in this order: people, ideas, and equipment. We've got really
bright people and they've got a lot of ideas, and they're trying to make
equipment work. If you look at a PRC-77 radio, technically it's supposed to
communicate about 3.5 kilometers; our high-powered gear on the vehicle mounts
is supposed to go up to 20 kilometers. We were stretching, from the first
element of my division to the rear, about 100 kilometers. We were able to
communicate because of the ideas people had. Putting a division Marine aboard
the airborne direct air support center the whole time allowed us communicate,
as did a lot of effort on setting up relays. You don't always have to be able to
talk to somebody if they know what has to be done, and they can keep quiet
unless they really have a problem.
Yes, technology worked and equipment worked, but a lot of the equipment
couldn't accommodate what we needed done. But people had the ideas that
made it work. A young warrant officer and a sergeant designed what is called
a fascine, and we made our own and mounted them on our AAVs.
I would temper the technology thing. It's ideas that make the equipment
work. I'll give you another example--Quickfire, a nonAoctrinal communications
net. We put an air officer with the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment to set up the
nets from the TPQ-36 fire-finder radars right to the FastFACs. If we had not
done that--and used the normal doctrinal procedures through regiment, division,
etc.--we'd never have gotten the job done.
Proceedings: There's been a lot of talk about maneuver warfare in the last 10
or 15 years. Has this affected the Marine Corps?
Myatt: I don't really like the term. I think we ought to talk about fighting
smart. If you focus first on the enemy and decide that you're not going to meet
them head on, you're going to try to find a flank or get behind them--because
once you're behind somebody, by and large, most people will quit--then fighting
smart is what FMFM-1 talks about. Fighting smart is what a lot of people have
been saying all along, which to me makes sense, rather than just, "Well, there
are a lot of forces there. Let's just attack. "I say attack, but attack from a
position of advantage.
So I think that's what General Gray was after, and I think that's what our
lieutenants are trained to do, that's what most of our captains are trained to do.
We have some people in more senior grades who want to put a label on it and
say they don't want any part of it because it's new. I think that it's, "Lead,
follow, or get the hell out of the way." I think we all need to concentrate on
fighting smart.
First Page |
Prev Page |
Next Page |
Src Image |