ANTllOLOGY AND ANN(Y~ATBD BIBLIOGRAPHY                                      145


Proceedings: How important do you consider the concept of the `1commander's
intent?"

Myatt: I think that's the whole business of fighting smart. That applies both to
garrison as well as what we saw in Desert Storm.    If people know what your
vision is, what you intend to happen, then they will take the initiative.    It
doesn't make any difference if they're in communications with you or not.

Proceedings: Has any particular lesson stuck with you?

Myatt: I think that we need to look very carefully at the Marine air command
and control system--what works and what doesn't--and what we invest in it.
Some very innovative things were done over there with how we give a direct air
support center [DASC] capability to both the divisions. They put an air support
element for people right in my CP.  There was none of this remote stuff, where
people were separated. I would like to see us break down some barriers here,
and decide what our Marine air command and control system from the DASC
point of view is going to look like in the future.
   They had liaison teams right down with the regiments. It works, and I'd just
like to see us explore that.

Proceedings: Is there anything that we've missed that you really wanted to talk
about?

Myatt: I think what we can't dismiss is the level of effort put into the defenses
along the beaches by the Iraqis.  I have to tell you that they were concerned
from day one about a threat from the sea.  When you get down and you look
at the really fine engineering effort that was done on defense of the beaches and
defense in<1epth against an attack coming from the sea, it tied up at least six of
the 11 Iraqi divisions that were facing I MEF.   I would say probably 40% to
50% of the Iraqi artillery pieces were pointed to the east in defense of this
perceived real threat--an attack from the Gulf.  There were literally hundreds
of antiaircraft weapon systems laid in a direct-fire mode from Saudi Arabia all
the way up way above Kuwait City to defend against the amphibious threat.
   So when people start agonizing over "There was no amphibious assault," you
must remember that what amphibious forces did accomplish was magnificent.
There are four kinds of amphibious operations, and our forces afloat did
demonstrations and they did raids.  They played a very key role, and I think it
saved a lot of Marine lives.