52                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 199O~I99I

   To the southwest of Task Force Taro, Task Force Papa Bear completed its
movement to its assigned tactical assembly area. Concerned about artillery fire,
Colonel Richard W. Hodory spread out the task force like the spokes of a
wheel. He had the command post in the center, with the 3d Battalion, 9th
Marines, to its northwest facing the berm; the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, to d~e
northeast, also facing the berm; the 1st Tank Battalion to the south; and the 1st
Combat Engineer Battalion detachment to the southwest.86 Each camp laagered
in, that is, set up in a 360-degree arc with the command and control vehicles to
the center and all fighting vehicles evenly spaced on the outside. Dismounted
Marines established individual positions which were integrated into the all-
around defense. With some slight adjustments for terrain and the specific enemy
situation, the laager position typical of desert mounted operations continued in
use throughout the offensive by every ft~rmation in the division.87
   Task Force Ripper held off moving to its final assembly area until the rest
of the division was in place. Colonel Fulford was determined to use the final
movement of Task Force Ripper as a tactical rehearsal. He intended to test the
assault timetable, check unit formations, and exercise the attack plan. The
distance from Task Force Ripper's intermediate assembly area to its final
assembly area was comparable to the distance from its attack position through
the second obstacle belt. By the time the task force moved, the desert was clear
of other units. The division command and control center contributed to the
realism of the rehearsal with exercise traffic.88
   The day  was  also busy for the   artillery. With five battalions spread
d~roughout the division's zone near their supported units, Colonel Howard,
commanding the artillery, confirmed the initial assignment of a direct support
battalion to each task force. Each commander could depend on the availability
of that battalion's firepower. General Myatt stressed to commanders during the
20 February sandtable exercise that he intended to change the direct support
battalions as Colonel Howard moved the artillery ft~rward to keep pace with the
division's advance.89
   Initially, he placed 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, in direct support of Task
Force Taro. That battalion was minus Battery E on a brief attachment to Task
Force Troy. Lieutenant Colonel Kershaw used its guns to conduct an artillery
raid. It fired two missions on 21 February. Late on 21 February, the 3d
Battalion, 12th Marines, left its positions and moved closer to the berm to
support Task Force Grizzly's night march into Kuwait.
   Of the remaining battalions,  Colonel Howard  kept 1st Battalion, 11th
Marines, in its direct support assignment with Task Force Papa Bear, and he left
3d Battalion, 11th Marines, with Task Force Ripper. The 5th Battalion, 11th
Marines, constituted the division's general support battalion to be used where
and when General Myatt needed it. At 1640 on 21 Febniary, the battalion took
up a position near the Saudi berm to reinforce 3d Battalion, 12th Marines if
Task Force Grizzly ran into problems during its infiltration.
   The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, gave priority of its fires to Task Force
Shepherd. At the moment, however, Task Force Shepherd had been reduced
drastically. Only Company B remained under Lieutenant Colonel Myers' control.