WITH THE 1ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM              53


Company A was attached to Task Force Troy. General Myatt moved Company
C to Task Force Taro as a screening element during the task force's slow
movement to a blocking position on the division's left flank.   Company D
returned to its former assignment with Task Force Ripper. With the exception
of Company D, the detachments were temporary.        Company A returned to
Myers' control on 22 February and General Myatt intended Company C to
rejoin the task force following the completion of Taro's movement. With the
division now positioned on the berm and preparing for the infiltration of Task
Forces Grizzly and Taro, General Myatt had no immediate mission for Task
Force Shepherd until 0-Day.90
   On the other hand, Task Force Troy experienced the busiest period in its
existence. On 21 February, it conducted a combined arms artillery fire mission
against an enemy observation tower. Poor weather made it impossible to assess
battle damage to the target. During a second fire mission, a target consisting of
four vehicles and personnel erecting an antenna, were spotted by Marine forward
observers, fired on, and dispersed.91  Subsequently, a forward air control team
from 3d ANGLICO directed a flight of AH-lW Sea Cobras to the area where
they found and destroyed about a half dozen enemy vehicles. Task Force Troy's
final action that day was the detention of seven enemy prisoners who "alleged"
to be Kuwaiti nationals. Lieutenant Colonel Kershaw had them transported to the
prisoner compound for fiirther interrogation.
   The division headquarters organized itself into a main command post and a
forward or jump command post.~ General Myatt, General Draude, and key
operations staff officers, departed the headquarters' camp in mid-afternoon and
moved north to an assembly area near OP 4. What remained of division
headquarters became the main command post led by the division Chief of Staff,
Colonel John F. Stennick. The day passed with headquarters personnel preparing
ft~r offensive operations. Trucks carried material to the direct support area at
Manifah Bay as the camp commandant identified excess equipment and baggage
for storage. That included all tentage, except that required for the command and
contn~l center. Within a few hours the division headquarters went from a large
tent camp to a scattering of shelter-halves and a small grouping of tents housing
the command and control center.93    In spite of these changes and regardless of
unit movements, the one event on 21 February that graphically signaled the
imminent offensive was General Myatt's order for all division personnel to begin
taking anti-chemical and anti-biological agents--called NAPP and CIPPO pills.9
   Meanwhile, the reconnaissance teams returned from their survey of the
minefields.95 Their encouraging reports indicated that the first obstacle belt was
largely undefended. The minefields, though dangerous, lacked depth and the
teams found no evidence of tank traps or berms. While pleased about the teams'
overall reporting, General Myatt remained anxious about the failure to discover
a path for Task Force Grizzly. He needed Colonel Fuiks's Marines covering the
division's left flank. Regardless of the lack of an identified lane, that evening
Colonel Fulks started 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
across the line of departure~%