WITH THE 1ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            57


   For the remainder of the division, 22 February passed quietly. Task Force
Papa Bear conducted a final task force sandtable exercise. Task Force Ripper
lost a Marine in Company B,    1st Battalion, 7th Marines, to an accidental
discharge of an M-16. Task Force Warden provided Task Force Taro and Task
Force Grizzly with specially trained EPW handling teams.1~
   There occurred a last-minute change to the artillery plan. In response to
Colonel Fulford's concern over the need to suppress enemy artillery and
defenses opposing Task Force Ripper's assault on the second obstacle belt,
General Myatt and Colonel Howard reevaluated the division artillery plan.
Fulford believed that reconnaissance of the two belts and recent intelligence
information indicated the first belt was not defended; the second belt was. For
that reason, he felt there was no longer a compelling need to mass five battalions
against the first belt and he proposed changing the firing position of the 3d
Battalion, 11th Marines, from a location south of the first obstacle belt to just
south of the second belt.
   The drawback to the plan was that it reduced the number of artillery
battalions available to support the assault on the first breach. It also placed the
3d Battalion in the middle of what was believed to be an Iraqi artillery fire sack
(zone planned for massed artillery fires). The division's offensive plan, however,
hinged on a quick breakout by Task Force Ripper. If it ran into trouble at the
second belt, it would lack the artillery support necessary to counter Iraqi artillery
fire. The change made sense from a logistics view. Colonel Howard agreed that
the division's supply of long-range rocket assisted projectile (RAP) ammunition
might prove insufficient if there occurred a prolonged engagement by five
artillery battalions against targets beyond the second belt.  General Myatt
concurred with the reassessment and approved Colonel Fulford's request. In
order to reduce the risk to the 3d Battalion, Fulford decided that it would follow
3d Tank Battalion until reaching its firing position. The decision did not affect
the other battalions, except that concern over supply of RAP ammunition led to
Myatt's decision to suspend its use except in emergency situations. LOt
   Colonel Howard made twO other changes to artillery dispositions. He moved
the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, to a position closer to the berm in order to be
in a better position to perform its general support mission, and to assist Task
Forces Taro and Grizzly in their operations that evening. Howard also shifted
the regimental headquarters forward. At 0404 on the morning of 22 February,
General Myatt, with General Draude, established the division forward command
post near the berm and assumed command and control of the division from the
main command post, then 20 miles south. General Myatt no sooner took control
than he faced three simultaneous operations by Task Force Troy, Task Force
Grizzly, and a patrol against Markaz. Task Force Troy required little attention
by General Myatt and its operations went without incident. On the other hand,
from Myatt's perspective,  the enemy  situation facing Task Force Grizzly
required most of his attention, particularly when an F/A-t8 pilot spotted the
armor movement against Task Force Grizzly. The division air officer at the
forward command post immediately called in a flight of F/A-18s. A series of air
strikes proved unsuccessful in turning back the armor force. At 0848, as the