58                                U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN 6UL~, 1990-1991


enemy tanks neared the minefield, General Myatt advised Colonel Fuiks of the
threat and began making arrangements for additional fighter/attack aircraft.
Myatt turned control of the aircraft to Colonel Fulks which he used later that
morning.
   General Myatt grew equally concerned over the threat to the division's right
flank. Intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqis had a strong force positioned
in a  built-up area west of the Al  Wafrah Oilfield. Task Force Taro
notwithstanding, the enemy's location was perfect for a devastating flank attack.
General Myatt wanted to know specifically what forces the Iraqis bad in the
area, what they were doing, and what were their defensive arrangements. This
prompted his decision to have elements from Company A, 3d Reconnaissance
Battalion (attached 1st Reconnaissance Battaiion) conduct a patrol against the
police station at Markaz al Fawaris west of the built-up area. Stealth was central
to the plan. Myatt wanted to keep outward signs of Marine interests in the area
to a minimum and instructed Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Rapp, the battalion
commander, to have it avoid getting engaged with the enemy. At 0130, the
patrol departed from its assembly position near OP-3. By 0545 it came within
sight of Markaz, where it encountered two enemy vehicles. The vehicle crews
could be seen moving around the station. They showed no sign of leaving,
which left the patrol leader with little option but to abort the mission at 0630.
The patrol returned to OP-3 without incident.t02

                    G Minus 1, 23 February 1991

   By 23 February, the spurious engagements begun two days earlier intensified
as division units moved into attack positions. The engagements failed to impede
the 1st Marine Division's advance, and, in one case, helped it. In front of Task
Force Grizzly the defending 83d Brigade, 29th Divisioji began to come apart.~03
The first indication of Iraqi instability occurred at 0141 when the forward
observers from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, spotted a long vehicle column east
of them. Forward observers directed an air strike against the Iraqi vehicles and
saw no further sign of the Iraqis.
   An hour and a half later, a second obsetwation team reported an enemy unit
to the north in the 2d Marine Division's zone. After coordinating with the 2d
Marine Division, Colonel Fulks received permission to cross the division
boundary. At 0555 while moving against the enemy, the left flank units of Task
Force Grizzly no sooner cleared a bunker complex than they encountered three
T-62s. The growing conflict to the north led Colonel Fulks to shift his command
post at 0800 to a more forward location. From there he improved his control
of the fight to the north as well as his ability to observe developments to the
task force's immediate front.
   At dawn, the failure of the night infiltration attempt caused Colonel Fulks
to order a daylight reconnaissance of the minefield. The mixed teams of scouts
and engineers departed task force lines at 0830 and moved to within one
kilometer of the minefield. From several locations along the front of the mine-