wrr~ THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            59


field, the teams called in artillery fire and air strikes against the minefield and
enemy bunkers. While the artillery fire destroyed two bunkers and four enemy
artillery guns, combat engineers in front of the 2d Battalion reconnoitered their
portion of the minefield. Enemy observers spotted the Marines and forced them
back with artillery fire. American fighter/attack aircraft immediately rolled in
to strike a nearby bunker complex and tanks. The air strike destroyed one tank
and killed six enemy soldiers. Nevertheless, that probe ended in another failure,
leaving Colonel Fulks out of time and forcing him to rethink his scheme of
maneuver. Reluctantly, he began planning to conduct a hasty breach. At 1300,
planning progressed far enough for him to hold a leader's rehearsal.
   The rehearsal no sooner ended than at 1500 Colonel Fuiks got a lucky break.
A reconnaissance team in front of the 3d Battalion observed the path taken
through the minefield by defecting Jraqis. Covered by another team, two scouts
and a combat engineer crossed the minefidd and captured an enemy bunker after
shooting three of its defenders. However, the Marines were too successful.
When Colonel Fulks requested permission to exploit the unexpected windfall,
General Myatt informed him that CentCom had passed on a Presidential order
prohibiting American forces from crossing the obstacle belt until all diplomatic
peace initiatives failed and President Bush approved launching the ground
offensive. That was not to occur until the evening, leaving Colonel Fulks
exasperated and causing him to recall the reconnaissance team with its prisoners.
For a time, the enemy bunkers in front of the 3d Battalion remained tantalizingly
empty.
   The order did not stop Colonel Fulks from using artillery and, in the course
of the remaining afternoon,  the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines,     and the 5th
Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 144 RAP rounds in an attempt to isolate the
bunkers and the minefield against reinforcements. At 1240, Colonel Fulks
moved   Battery B, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, into Kuwait in an effort to
provide close artillery support to the reconnaissance teams in front of the 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines. In a two-hour period, the battery fired two missions
against enemy fortified positions. Its fire aggravated the Iraqis to such an extent
that at 1730 the enemy responded with counterbattery fire in an attempt to si-
lence Battery B. The Iraqi salvo fell to one side of the battery and the Marines
took no casualties in the exchange.
   Prohibited from conducting an infantry assault to establish a breach, Colonel
Fulks continued to call in artillery on every Iraqi position identified by Marine
observers. To his surprise, the artillery fire proved sufficient to destabilize the
Iraqi line. The collapse started with further defections from the area of the
abandoned bunker complex. At 1645, Colonel Fuiks reported the surrender of
10 more enemy soldiers to the 3d Battalion. A psychological operations team
moved forward and its broadcasts encouraged further defections to such an
extent that the local Iraqi commander was reported to have directed mortar and
artillery fire on his own troops to prevent their surrendering. At 1740 in front
of the 2d Battalion, 22 Iraqi soldiers arrived at the minefield in three transport
vehicles, dismounted, and walked across the obstacle belt. In the process they
revealed another path through the minefield.