90                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


          G Plus 1, 25 Febnia,y 1991: `Possible enemy attack'

    At 0109 General Myatt saw the Iraqi maps captured by Task Force Ripper
and heard the statements by several captured officers that began to concern him
that a counterattack was imminent. However, for a time, he and his headquarters
staff continued to  focus on the Jaber &ea--that  was where the  original
concentration of Iraqi artillery (and the greatest threat to the division) had been.
As the night wore on further intelligence reported an armor/mechanized brigade-
size force and an armor brigade to the northeast. If correct, the two brigades
were well positioned to strike the division's front and right flanks. Attempts to
confirm the location of the enemy units failed because of the flames and smoke
rising from the burning Al Burqan Oilfield.'~
    Intercepts of Iraqi radio traffic soon convinced General Myatt that the enemy
was going to attempt something. He then alerted his commanders and reassessed
the division's defenses. The position was as well laid out as allowed by the
chaotic conditions of the previous evening. In front of Task Forces Ripper and
Papa Bear, Myatt had Lieutenant Colonel Myers establish a screen with LAVs,
antitank HMMWVs, and scout teams. The main line consisted of a series of
battalion battle positions. Commanders placed tanks and antitank weapons to
the front to favor their integral thermal and night vision devices.
    General Myatt made adjustments to the division's defenses. He judged his
front to be thinly defended and lacking a sufficient antitank strength. He also
concluded that the division command post was too far forward in its location
just south of the thinly defended lines near the Emir's Farm. The placement of
the forward command post at that location reflected Major General Myatt's
belief that the commander should be as far forward as possible. There were
practical reasons  as well. Brigadier General Draude wanted to have the
headquarters out of the fire sack between the two obstacle belts, and Myatt
wanted to be in the best location for organizing and launching the next day's
attack.'49 Only Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, occupied that portion
of the line. General Myatt decided to reinforce Company C with the nearest
unit available, a LAV company from Task Force Shepherd. Accordingly, at
0645, Company B, Task Force Shepherd linked up with Company C in front
of division headquarters.
    Few in the company expressed any joy over the assignment. After six months
in the desert, they wanted to get into the fight, but so far the war seemed to pass
them by. During the engagement of 29-30 January at OP 4, Lieutenant Colonel
Myers did not commit Company B until the end. On 0-Day the company
scarcely fired a shot. Now, just as the division launched its final attack,
Company B got an assignment which promised little combat. Captain Eddie S.
Ray, the company commander, was so upset about the assignment that he
approached Brigadier Gei~ral Draude and asked if the company could be
returned to the line as soon as feasible. General Draude understood Captain
Ray's frustration but advised him that the company was needed in front of the
division command post for the time being.'~~ As events turned out, Company B's