WITH THE 1ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM               91

departure from Task Force Shepherd put it in position as the center piece in the
most important engagement fought by the 1st Marine Division during the war.
   General Myatt made another fortunate adjustment to the division's defensive
lines. Concerned about what enemy units might be hiding in the Al Burqan
Oilfield, he ordered the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, to conduct a reconnaissance
in force into the oilfield at first light. By waiting for dawn, Myatt hoped to
avoid friendly fire casualties. In the period of time necessary for Lieutenant
Colonel Humble to orient the division for the drive to the Kuwait International
Airport, General Myatt wanted a thorough probe of the oilfield, even though the
Iraqi attack had so far failed to develop. Other intelligence information coming
to division headquarters     indicated that the enemy was building a sizable
counterattack force. At 0730, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, attacked into the Al
Burqan towards Gathering Center 4. It found movement difficult. A combination
of thick black smoke and morning fog reduced visibility to 200 meters and less.
   Myatt decided to mass the fire from the five artillery battalions to disrupt
the attack before it got organized.     The  11th Marines quickly responded.
Nevertheless, Brigadier General Draude found the time required to shift the
guns to be "agonizingly slow. ii S  At 0753 when he received the order, Colonel
Howard had only one battery oriented to the area, but two brief orders from the
regimental fire direction center massed every available artilleiy piece against the
separated Iraqi brigades. Howard fired on the targets in sequence with the order:
"Regiment; four rounds DPICM or RAP as range appropriate; Time on Target,
0817" against the armored-mechanized brigade, and: "Regiment; four rounds
DPICM or RAP as range appropriate; Time on Target, 0820" against the site
of the armored brigade. As directed, at 0817 11 batteries from four battalions
fired on the first target.  A barrage of 244 rounds fell on the Iraqi 22d Bri-
gade, 5th Mechanized Division. Three minutes later,    13 batteries from five
battalions shifted to the site of intelligence subsequently discovered to be the
Iraqi 15th Brigade, 3d Armored Division and fired a barrage of 496 rounds of
RAP and DPICM. The enemy did not immediately respond to the Marine
artillery.'52
   The Iraqi attack began from the east with a feint against the left flank.
followed by large-scale assaults against the right flank and center.
   The first attack struck Task Forces Shepherd and Task Force Ripper at about
OS 15. To the Marines of Company D, Task Force Shepherd, the assault seemed
reminiscent of the engagement at OP 4. Under cover of an overcast and dark
night an Iraqi column made its way south towards Al Jaber guiding on a north-
south running power line. When Company D spotted the enemy vehicles they
opened a running fight, hitting the Iraqis with a combination of TOW missiles
and 25mm fire. Slowly moving south, Company D knocked out five enemy
tanks and one truck from the rear of the column. The main line of Task Force
Ripper engaged the column's front when it came in range. By 0620 the 3d Tank
Battalion's TOWs found themselves in an intense firefight with 20 vehicles and
an unspecified number of dismounted infantry. The TOW fire soon dispersed
the attacking force which ended the first Iraqi assault.'53