92                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

    Meanwhile, Colonel Hodory on the division's right flank held an "orders
group" to discuss General Myatt's changes to the task ft~rce mission and the
possibility of an Iraqi attack. The meeting proved difficult to put together. Dense
fog enveloped the area and reduced visibility to 100 meters. Unit commanders
with their operations officers found getting to regimental headquarters  an
arduous exercise. They groped through fog and smoke so thick that some never
got to the meeting on time and needed to be briefed separately.  Consequent-
ly, the "orders group  took longer than intended.
    The fog proved as much a problem for the Iraqis as it did for the Marines.
It disoriented the enemy force. Instead of striking Marine lines with mass, the
attack dissipated and drifted into Task Force Papa Bear. Some enemy units
collided with positions along the main line, some slipped past and moved into
the center of the task force. The first encounter surprised both sides. An enemy
force aiming for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, missed the Marine battalion and
kept driving until coming into contact with the task force headquarters.
    At 0800 Colonel Hodory and his staff were still briefing late arriving
commanders when a T-55 tank and three Type-63 armored personnel carriers
emerged from the fog and halted about 50 meters from where Colonel Hodory
stood.1~4  The tank sat motionless with its gun perfectly sighted on Hodory's
cominand vehicles. It never fired. Instead, the brigade commander came forward
and surrendered to the astonished Marines. When questioned, he revealed that
his ft~rce made up part of the 22d Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division assigned to
attack the American right flank. When questioned further, he explained that he
no longer wished to fight nor did the group accompanying him. However, he
could not speak for those behind him in the fog.
    As Colonel Hodory digested this information, the rest of the Iraqi force
began an attack on the task force command post with tank and automatic
weapons fire. The task force 5-3, Major John H. Turner, saw that:15~

             We had main gun rounds, machine gun tracers and even
             5.56mm fire (from India 3/9) coming through the CP.
             I remember hitting the deck for the first time during the
             war and I saw tracers going through the CP from east
             to west at knee height.

    The headquarters countered with a combination of MK-19s, machine guns,
and light antitank weapons. In ten minutes, they destroyed or disabled one
enemy tank and several armored personnel carriers, and forced the Iraqis to
retreat into the fog.
    Colonel Hodory notified commanders that headquarters was under attack by
a brigade-size force. He told 1st Tank Battalion to expect the Iraqi assault to
come  in   an easterly direction, parallel to the second obstacle belt. That
information required the 1st Tank Battalion, which had already faced north in
anticipation of resuming the division attack,  to redeploy facing east. The
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Kephart, then called the
company commanders in for a meeting. However, the briefing had scarcely