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File: aabvb_15.txt
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          to HQ MAC/HQ AFLC. Ensure all WRM vehicles/equipment are available for
          redistribution on day one. MAJCOMS must be required to respond in a timely
          manner with support information on command levies. We had no visibility of
          their actions to support command levies. The WRM Fleet concept should be
          continued. Better contingency type WRSK kits are required and should be
          stored with vehicles. Get funds early on so we can attempt to qualify second
          sources and primary sources and order raw material in sufficient quantities.

          f. What have we learned about maintenance concepts - intermediate -
          depot in-theater?

          (1) We had no inputs to repair/overhaul problems/decisions in the
         AOR.
          (2) Consumables, i.e., filters, fluids, belts, hoses, batteries,
          tires, etc., should be packed and be shipped with vehicles.
          (3) Tech data should be updated to reflect hostile environments that
          could be encountered.

          g. Vehicle Acceleration 

          (1) Background: We had maintenance compression appendix A's
        prepared early for our depot overhaul Contracts and did in fact accelerate
        new production deliveries, including 10K fork-lifts, backhoes, high-line
        docks, pallets and nets. The use of premium pay to accelerate deliveries was
        only marginally successful. This was due to numerous factors including lack
        of parts in inventory, facility limitations, equipment limitations, and lack
        of available personnel.

         (2) Action Taken: We accelerated/compressed vehicle overhaul and
        did ADR's of many commodities. Most notable was pallets/nets.

        (3) Action Required: An action that could be taken would be to put
        acceleration/surge requirements in our solicitations/procurement documents so
        that contractors would be forced to plan for contingencies. This action
        could also be prohibitively expensive.

            b. OPlan 70

        (1) Background: In accordance with OPlan 70 retrograde of
        pallets/nets were supposed to begin early in the contingency. The retrograde
        did not happen in a timely manner. The lack of early implementation of OPlan
        70 was probably responsible for CENTAF's initial inability to access USAFE
        WRM. This resulted in deploying units having to ship their own POS vehicles
        instead of using WRM vehicles propositioned in Europe.

       (2) Actions Taken:  HQ MAC/HQ AFLC assumed responsibility for RDO
       action concerning pallets/net availability at aerial ports and Log Air
       stations: This was a good move as WR-ALC/LV had no visibility of cargo
 
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