Tech Orders,

File: aacep_20.txt
Page: 20
Total Pages: 59

personnel were already in place. Frequently, a contract for food
service had already been let without Services input. The Services
personnel had to live with the contract until other arrangements
could be made. Although the Air Force feeding concept called for
eating MREs for the first ten days of a deployment, commanders were
anxious to supplement the rations as soon as practical. services
personnel began to explore the availability of ~ rations (fresh
fruit, vegetables, and baked goods) in the local area. Often the
local vendors sought out the Americans to offer their products.
The primary concern was the quality and safety of the food
purchased on the local economy. Food service personnel,
accompanied by the medics, evaluated the food preparation methods
and facilities for proper sanitation. Local military and
government officials also offered their evaluation on the quality
and reliability of the catering services. Many times, the local
officials recommended a relative to the Americans. At some sites,
such as Al Ayn, Air Force personnel ate contract meals as a
supplement to the MREs exclusively until November. This was due to
the availability of this service and the lack of food preparation
facilities at the site
Communication shortfalls plagued the early days of the
deployment. E & S personnel found it difficult to communicate with
CENTAF, their home station, or anyone off the base. Usually, only
commercial lines were available. At that tine, most information
such as location, base population, or anything that could give a
clue about the expected population or mission, was classified.
his made it difficult to talk over commercial ~ lines without a STU-
III and most Prime BEEF or RIBS teams did not have one. A code
soon developed between the sites and CENTAF. Instead of naming
sites or units, the caller simply stated who the site engineer was
at their site and CENTAF checked their master list. when Communications personnel arrived, the situation improved with the installation of AUTOVON lines and satellite communications.
On-base communications were also difficult. Prime BEEF and
RIBS teams deployed with a set of hand-held "brick" radios. The
teams did not always bring a base station or repeaters.
Communicating over the vast distances at some of the sites was
impossible with only the bricks. At a few locations, problems
developed when the host nation and the American forces were using
the same frequency. This called for careful negotiations and
cooperation with the host nation. the mass purchase of
programmable, multi-channel radios in October provided the
communication _ capability needed at each of the sites.
One of the frustrations experienced by E & S forces at the
sites involved the Harvest Falcon basing assets Most personnel
had never trained on the equipment because it was new to the Air
Force and was considered SWA theater specific. So when the TEMPER
tents and utility systems began appearing at a site, many without
TOs, the engineers were uncertain what constituted a complete set,
how they were to be assembled, or how to repair the equipment.
Using their ingenuity and flexibility, the engineers quickly laid
out the pieces, determined what went where, and began putting up