Tech Orders,

File: aacep_21.txt
Page: 21
Total Pages: 59
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       the tents . The first tent took about four hours to construct . By
       the third or fourth tent, this was down to less than one hour.40
       Technical Orders described the design and assembly of the
       equipment and also listed the part numbers to facilitate ordering
       spare parts. These were supposed to accompany the different pieces
       of Harvest Falcon equipment delivered to the sites. However, few
       sites received them. Equipment was either so new that a Technical
       Order had not been developed or linsufficientt quantities of TOs were
       available. The 4449 th Mobility Support Squadron, Hollomen AFB, New
       Mexico, only maintained three deployable TO sets . These were
       quickly distributed in early August and the later sites had to
       scramble. Finally, HQ TAC/DE sent boxes of TOs to CENTAF/DE and
       the staff spent hours at the copying machine making sufficient
       quantities to distribute to the sites.4
       Delivery of the Harvest Falcon equipment complicated the bare
       base construction. Boxes containing critical pieces sometimes did
       not arrive when they are needed or were missing parts. For
       example, a shower/shave unit would arrive and be erected, but no
       PVC pipe was on hand to connect the facility to the water source.
       Sometimes the equipment arrived on base but was either misplaced or
       "borrowed" by another organization. Harvest Falcon assets were
       delivered to bases with few markings other than the name of the
       base. Whoever happened to be on the fllghtline when the materials
       arrived had first opportunity to claim it . Several site engineers
       permanently positioned a Representative from their team on the
       flightline to monitor and claim what was rightly theirs. Of
       course, when other services jointly occupied the same base, this
       became even more critical.42
      The War Readiness Spares Kits {WRSK ) for several Harvest
      Falcon items often did not accompany the item or were incomplete.
      In October 1991, CENTAF reported, "We only have to date 6 0 percent
      of the required WRSK kits in theater for electrical generators and
      the fill rate on some of the kits is less than 30 percent."43
      Inevitably the most critical items or those which broke down first
      were the items missing from the kits. Filters for generators were
      scarce and the engineers resorted to using panty hose. The WRSK
      shortage forced operators to "abuse" their equipment. Many
      generators were operated for sixteen maintenance cycles without any
      routine maintenance . 44
                   A major problem for E & S personnel was their inability to
      monitor the prepositioned equipment (primarily Harvest Falcon
      assets ) and vehicles. The Air Force Logistics community had
      responsibility for the materiel stored at the propositioning sites
      and its delivery to the bases. The user of most of the
      propositioned equipment, Engineering and Services personnel, had no
      control over it until it arrived on base. Engineers arrived at
      sites unsure about when the Harvest Falcon equipment was scheduled
to arrive, how much was coming, or exactly what was coming.  The
      CENTAF/DE staff f could only pass requirements for propositioned
      as sets to the CENTAF/LG staff f to work, based on CENTAF planning or
      input from the sites. However, CENTAF/DE never had an approximate
      inventory of the propositioned assets during the deployment. In
  
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