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File: aacep_22.txt
22
mid-November, Colonel Rothenberg complained, CENTAF/DE continues
to have little to no insight into the availability of Harvest
Falcon assets. We now have a good idea of what has been installed
and operational now, but are totally at the mercy of the [G
community for replacement assets."45 With more requirements than
could generally be met, CENTAF/DE personnel were often in a
quandary over how to divide an unknown number of equipment items.
Thus when several sites requested additional MEP-12 generators,
the CENTAF/DE staff had no idea how to divide the assets between
the sites because they never knew when they were requesting the
last propositioned item. Managing an unknown quantity of equipment
could have become critical if hostilities had broken out earlier
and a base by an enemy attack. Even al late as
1991, CENTAF/DE reported they did not know the number of ROWPUs,
IF[s, latrines, MKTs, and 150 cubic foot refer units in the Air
Force inventory, how many were propositioned before August 1990, or
bow many had been shipped from the CONUS.
A shortage of vehicles and heavy equipment slowed the beddown
process. Engineers, as with everyone else, found any type of
transportation scarce during the first days and weeks of the
deployment. Trucks and flatbeds were required to move the shipping
containers from the flightline to tent city or the operations area.
Engineers also had to move supplies, cable, generators,and myriad
other bulky items around the site. Services personnel were
required to move mountains of rations and oceans of bottled water.
The most valuable piece of equipment was probably a forklift,
preferably an all-terrain forklift. Forklifts were in demand by
most organizations on base. They could move nearly anything E & S
personnel needed to move. It was not until extensive rental
vehicles and equipment began to arrive on base that the situation
improved.
Complicating the beddown planning and execution were the
numerous restrictions the host nation placed upon the U.S. Air
Force. At Bateen AB, UAE, the personnel supporting the C-130
deployment were restricted to a small area for their tents and
trailers. These crowded conditions meant the engineers had to plan
the efficient use of every square foot of space.The beddown site on the base was directly opposite the parking area for the C-130s, separated by only a road. When the aircraft started their engines,
the whole camp knew it. The host nation set a population cap at
several locations. The American population at Sharjah AB, UAE
could not exceed 800. An aircraft arriving with passengers was
carefully controlled. CMSgt Luis L.Castillo from CENTAF/DE tried
to visit the site on a staff assistance visit and was not even
allowed off the plane. At most sites, the host nation was quite
cooperative, particularly if the Americans were sensitive to the
cultural differences and were willing to take the necessary time to
work with their hosts.
The multi-command and multi-service presence at a few bases
presented challenges for engineers. King Fahd IAP hosted elements
of the 1st Special Operations Wing from Hurlburt Field, the 354th
TFW from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, the 23d TFW from England
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