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File: aacep_22.txt
Page: 22
Total Pages: 59


                                       22
      
       mid-November, Colonel Rothenberg complained, CENTAF/DE continues
       to have little to no insight into the availability of Harvest
       Falcon assets. We now have a good idea of what has been installed
       and operational now, but are totally at the mercy of the [G
       community for replacement assets."45 With more requirements than
       could generally be met, CENTAF/DE personnel were often in a
       quandary over how to divide an unknown number of equipment items.
       Thus when several sites requested additional MEP-12 generators,
       the CENTAF/DE staff had no idea how to divide the assets between
       the sites because they never knew when they were requesting the
       last propositioned item. Managing an unknown quantity of equipment
       could have become critical if hostilities had broken out earlier
       and a base by an enemy attack. Even al late as
      1991, CENTAF/DE reported they did not know the number of ROWPUs,
      IF[s, latrines, MKTs, and 150 cubic foot refer units in the Air
      Force inventory, how many were propositioned before August 1990, or
      bow many had been shipped from the CONUS.
       A shortage of vehicles and heavy equipment slowed the beddown
       process. Engineers, as with everyone else, found any type of
       transportation scarce during the first days and weeks of the
       deployment. Trucks and flatbeds were required to move the shipping
       containers from the flightline to tent city or the operations area.
      Engineers also had to move supplies, cable, generators,and myriad
      other bulky items around the site. Services personnel were
      required to move mountains of rations and oceans of bottled water.
      The most valuable piece of equipment was probably a forklift,
      preferably an all-terrain forklift. Forklifts were in demand by
      most organizations on base. They could move nearly anything E & S
      personnel needed to move. It was not until extensive rental
      vehicles and equipment began to arrive on base that the situation
      improved.
      Complicating the beddown planning and execution were the
      numerous restrictions the host nation placed upon the U.S. Air
      Force. At Bateen AB, UAE, the personnel supporting the C-130
      deployment were restricted to a small area for their tents and
      trailers. These crowded conditions meant the engineers had to plan
      the efficient use of every square foot of space.The beddown site  on the base was directly opposite the parking area for the C-130s,  separated by only a road. When the aircraft started their engines,
      the whole camp knew it. The host nation set a population cap at
      several locations. The American population at Sharjah AB, UAE
      could not exceed 800. An aircraft arriving with passengers was
      carefully controlled. CMSgt Luis L.Castillo from CENTAF/DE tried
      to visit the site on a staff assistance visit and was not even
      allowed off the plane. At most sites, the host nation was quite
      cooperative, particularly if the Americans were sensitive to the
      cultural differences and were willing to take the necessary time to
      work with their hosts.
             The multi-command and multi-service presence at a few bases
      presented challenges for engineers. King Fahd IAP hosted elements
      of the 1st Special Operations Wing from Hurlburt Field, the 354th
      TFW from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, the 23d TFW from England
      


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