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File: 970207_aadct_005.txt
MEDICAL LESSONS LEARNED
DESERT SHIELD/STORM
CATEGORY: TRAINING
ISSUE ITEM #:
SUBJECT: TRAINING-Total Force Integration
BACKGROUND: There were instances of rank structure problems both
from a clinical standpoint of reserve providers of care
outranking active duty counterparts, and from an administrative
standpoint of the best qualified individual not being in charge
because active duty held all the command positions.
DISCUSSION: The clinical rank structure inversion is a product of
the limited command opportunities within the reserves and the
population we recruit from. Older, more established physicians
and nurses are attracted to the reserves and come in at higher
rank. The position of the reserves is that these individuals are
to be recalled to provide clinical services and are not expected
to be in command or leadership roles. This position is not always
understood by both the individual and active duty personnel. The
reverse situation also occured in instances where reserve
commanders were not allowed to command the troops they normally
train with and command.
ACTION RECOMMENDED: Reserve providers need continually reminders
that their role in a call-up is clinical. Active duty personnel
need to be sensitized to the fact that these reservists are
experienced senior officers and should be treated with respect
due their rank regardless of their lack of administrative roles.
In regard to command positions, it should be recognized that for
certain missions, the reserves probably have the most experienced
and best qualified commanders.There should be a more flexible
policy that would allow the best qualified officers to be in
charge whether they are active or reserve. Mobilized units should
be commanded by their own senior staff whenever possible.
SUGGESTED OPR(s), OCR(s): SGH
COL KOENIGSBERG
[(b)(2)]
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